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Eminent domain, or the power to take, is generally analyzed as the quintessential
government power. It is unsurprising, therefore, that scholars tend to operate from the
basic assumption that eminent domain is solely an incident of the government's domain
in the provision of public good& This assumption has led to widespread criticism of the
courts' evisceration of the "public use" requirement, and repetition of the mantra that
the government cannot simply take from A in order to give to B
In this Article, I show that this conception of takings is too narrow. In function, if
not in name, eminent domain is simply another property arrangement, and, as such, it is
adaptable to private property law even without state action. Indeed, private takings-
that is, takings carried out by nongovernmental actors-have a solid basis in our legal
system. Additionally, the justifications for government takings lend themselves just as well
to private taking& Recognizing the importance and legitimacy of private takings leads to
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two central claims. First, I argue that private takings should often be a preferred mechan-
ism for achieving goals generally accomplished today through public takings Second, I
show that identifying private takings as a vital category helps clarify the proper concerns
of takings law- not only the constitutionally demanded "just compensation" offered for
takings and the posttaking "public use," but also to the pretaking original use.
Having made these central claims; I posit that a comprehensive law of takings can
be developed that encompasses both private and public takings In the realm of theory, the
Article circumscribes the place of takings within the broader theory of entitlements by
defining takings within the context of mixed property and liability ("pliability") rules
Normatively, the Article argues for the incorporation of private taking mechanisms into
fields generally seen as the domain of classic property law and regulation.
INTRODUCTION
The popular firestorm surrounding the Supreme Court's recent
ruling in Kelo v City of New London' focused on public incomprehen-
sion that the government may simply take property from one private
property owner and transfer it to another private owner.'
In the popular conception, eminent domain-the power to take
property without the owner's consent-is the quintessential govern-
ment power. Generally, only the government has the power to change
property rules midstream, and unilaterally alter, abolish, or appropri-
ate another's rights over her property. It is unsurprising, therefore, that
notwithstanding the fog of uncertainty and dispute that clouds the
nature and scope of the takings power, scholars tend to operate from
the basic assumption that eminent domain is solely an incident of the
government's domain in the provision of public goods Indeed, case
reporters abound with judicial pronouncements that the legal system
does not tolerate "private eminent domain."' Even where such takings
1 545 US 469 (2005).
2 See, for example, Statement of Senator John Cornyn, The Protection of Homes; Small
Businesses and Private Property Act of 2005 (June 27, 2005), online at http://www.cornyn.senate.
gov/doc archive/jcother/PHSB%20and%20PPA%202005%20floor%20statement.pdf (visited Apr
14, 2009) (expressing shock and alarm at the Court's decision in Kelo). See also generally Abra-
ham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 Colum L Rev 1412
(2006) (summarizing and disagreeing with criticisms of the Kelo decision).
3 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Emi-
nent Domain 331 (Harvard 1985); Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 124
(Belknap 2004). For some notable exceptions, see Thomas Merrill, The Economics of Public Use,
72 Cornell L Rev 61, 81 (1986) (examining economic rationales behind eminent domain); Saul
Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 Va L Rev 117, 142-44
(1982) (suggesting that a private eminent domain power may be a worthy alternative to "optimal
dishonesty" under certain unspecified circumstances). Compare Denis J. Brion, Rhetoric and the
Law of Enterprise, 42 Syracuse L Rev 117, 151 (1991) (analyzing occasional judicial and legislative
adoption of "private eminent domain" remedies as the result of some clashes in property rights).
4 See, for example, Conaway v Yolo Water & Power Co, 266 P 944,946 (Cal 1928) (indicat-
ing that the state or a public service corporation may use eminent domain); City of Los Angeles v
Aitken, 52 P2d 585,592 (Cal App 1935) (stating that eminent domain could not be used to trans-
fer a property interest in water from one private entity to another).
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are mediated by government action, the courts have no hesitation in
pronouncing that "it has long been accepted that the sovereign may
not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to
another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation."'
Yet, these bold pronouncements are unwarranted. Private tak-
ings-that is, takings carried out by nongovernmental actors-have
long existed, in some form or another, in our legal system.6 Numerous
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century laws established mechanisms for
nongovernmental entities such as ordinary corporations to take pri-
vate property by eminent domain. Railroads, for instance, were often
granted the power to take private lands (for compensation) that lay
along the route of the intended rail line.7 Nineteenth-century Mill Acts
permitted the erection of mills notwithstanding the consequent flood-
ing of others' riparian properties, so long as the new mill owner paid
compensation. 8 Corporations were delegated powers of eminent do-
main directly in their corporate charters.' Numerous relics of such de-
legated private takings powers continue to this day."'
5 Kelo, 545 US at 477.
6 Some have used the term "private takings" more narrowly to refer to public takings
motivated by a "private purpose." See, for example, Ed Nosal, Private Takings *1 (Federal Re-
serve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper No 07-13, Oct 2007), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1021812 (visited Apr 14,2009) (defining private takings as takings "where local and state govern-
ments have the authority to condemn private property for private use"); Robert Ashbrook, Com-
ment, Land Development, the Graham Doctrine, and the Extinction of Economic Due Process,
150 U Pa L Rev 1255,1291 n 185 (2002) (using the term "private taking" to refer to confiscation of
property "not for a public purpose, but rather for the benefit of another private entity"). I propose
different terminology. As I note later in the Article, public takings for a private purpose may accu-
rately be described as publicly mediated private takings. See Part lI.B. However, there are many
other instances of private takings "Private takings" has also been used more broadly to refer to
coercive transfers, including quasi-contract. See Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, Private
Takings Private Taxes, Private Compulsory Services: The Economic Doctrine of Quasi-contracts, 15
Intl Rev L & Econ 463, 463 (1995) (using the term "taking" to refer to all coercive transfers). As I
discuss below, my definition of private takings includes only cases where the taker is able, of her
own volition, to alter property rule protection over another's property into temporary liability rule
protection, and is thereafter entitled to property rule protection of her own. See Part II.A. Thus,
many forms of coercive transfer do not fall under the category of private takings. See Part H.C.
7 See, for example, Holbert v St L, K C & N R Co, 45 Iowa 23,26 (1876).
8 See, for example, Head v Amoskeag, 113 US 9,20-21 (1885) (finding the New Hampshire
Mill Act constitutional, while avoiding ruling specifically on the constitutionality of delegations
of eminent domain power to private actors for public use); Scudder v Trenton Delaware Falls Co, 1
NJ Eq 694, 729-30 (1832) (upholding a New Jersey statute granting a private corporation the
right to condemn land for seventy mill sites along a six-mile stretch of the Delaware River). See
also Theodore Steinberg, Nature Incorporated: Industrialization and the Waters of New England
31-32 (Cambridge 1991) (detailing the history of the Mill Acts and suggesting that these acts
"represented a more dynamic understanding of water as a form of property").
9 See, for example, Eppley v Bryson City, 73 SE 197,197-98 (NC 1911).
10 See Part III.A.
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Additionally, many governmental takings today are functionally
private takings. In government-mediated private takings," the govern-
ment is formally responsible for taking property, but in fact it simply
acts as a middleman who transfers the property from one set of private
hands to another. More than a half-century ago, in Berman v Parker,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an urban develop-
ment project established by the District of Columbia Redevelopment
Act of 1945, under which privately owned land (including residential
and commercial properties, of which only some constituted "slum hous-
ing") was taken for subsequent transfer to private developers.13 Similar-
ly, Hawaii's Land Reform Act of 1967, the constitutionality of which
was upheld in Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff,1 4 instituted a land
distribution program in which the state of Hawaii confiscated property
of large landowners to redistribute it to the erstwhile tenants in ex-
change for a negotiated price or a price set by the condemning court."
The infamous case of Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of De-
troiJ6 approved the city of Detroit's takings of a number of private lots
in order to transfer them to General Motors for building a new factory."
In Kelo v City of New London, the Supreme Court upheld New Lon-
don's taking of private residences for a plan that included the transfer
of much of the land to private developers for office space."
Much criticism has been heaped upon Kelo and the effective evis-
ceration of the constitutional requirement that takings be made for a
"public use." Indeed, shortly before Kelo, the Michigan Supreme Court
itself disavowed Poletown's broad interpretation of public use in Coun-
ty of Wayne v Hathcock.19 And in the wake of Kelo, Congress and near-
ly every state legislature has taken up proposals to limit takings lack-
ing sufficient "public use."2° Commentators have assailed the Berman-
11 Such takings have also been labeled "public-private takings." See, for example, Peter J.
Kulick, Rolling the Dice: Determining Public Use in Order to Effectuate a "Public-private Taking"- A
Proposal to Redefine "Public Use," 2000 Detroit Coil L 639,642 n 8.
12 348 US 26 (1954).
13 Id at 35-36 (holding that the government could use eminent domain powers to take
property and transfer it to private developers to improve blighted urban areas).
14 467 US 229 (1984).
15 Id at 233-34.
16 304 NW2d 455 (Mich 1981).
17 Idat460.
18 Kelo, 545 US at 484. More precisely, the New London municipality delegated the power
of eminent domain to the New London Development Corporation.
19 684 NW2d 765 (Mich 2004).
20 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 106 Colum L Rev at 1418 & n 27 (cited in note 2) (indicat-
ing that forty-three states introduced legislation in 2006 limiting eminent domain to spur eco-
nomic development). For a collection of reports on the proposed legislation, see Castle Coalition,
Legislative Center, online at http://www.castlecoalition.orgrtndex.php?option=com-content&task=
view&id=34&Itemid=119 (visited Apr 14,2009).
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Midkiff-Kelo interpretation of public use.2' Nineteenth-century legal
mechanisms permitting private takings have also come under their
share of criticism," or have been rationalized as quasi-public takings for
the benefit of quasi-public common carriers." This would seem to indi-
cate that expanded use of private takings would not readily find sup-
port. Yet, I argue otherwise.
This Article makes two central claims. First, I argue, contrary to ac-
cepted wisdom, that private takings not only should be permitted but
should be preferred as a mechanism for a number of goals. The power
to seize ownership of property notwithstanding the owner's objections
is as necessary to overcome strategic problems in the private market -
when they arise -as it is when the government seeks to obtain property
for a public use. And, while there is need to police such takings to pre-
vent abuse, there are better means of doing so than requiring the gov-
ernment to carry out the taking. Relative to a mechanism of properly
compensated private takings, the government's intermediary role is
frequently counterproductive and inefficient. Additionally, due to rent-
seeking by government agents or interest groups, there are times when
the discipline of markets is more effective than the discipline of politics
in curbing undesirable takings. Moreover, the basic policy reasons un-
derlying the governmental power of takings support an expanded use of
private takings, even in cases where public takings are not currently em-
ployed. Accordingly, this Article offers an outline for determining when
private takings should be permitted, and when they should be preferred
over public takings.4 This framework produces several normative in-
sights about how a law of private takings can be created that overcomes
some of the shortcomings of the nineteenth-century law of private tak-
ings and that fits with modem understandings of the importance of a
takings power to overcome strategic problems between potential clai-
mants of a resource. The analysis has broader implications as well, de-
monstrating some of the factors that must be incorporated into an anal-
ysis of when public goods ought to be provided for under private law.
Second, and no less importantly, I create the normative basis for a
private takings theory by analyzing takings within the framework of
property theory, rather than as a narrow governmental power. Viewing
21 See, for example, Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain after Kelo v. City of New London:
An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 Harv J L & Pub Policy 491,543-51
(2006); Epstein, Takings at 179-81 (cited in note 3).
22 See Part III.C.
23 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Blind Justices: The Scandal of Kelo v. New London,
Opinion Journal (Wall Street Journal July 3, 2005), online at http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/
?id=110006904 (visited Apr 14,2009) (criticizing the Supreme Court's expansion of the public use
requirement).
24 See Part III.
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takings law through a property theory lens permits a clearer identifica-
tion of the essential pieces of takings law, and a better understanding of
many current controversies regarding ordinary public takings and the
constitutional duty to compensate. Taking account of private takings as
a category of involuntary transfer of property ownership highlights the
fact that takings law should undertake to transfer property where two
factors are present-where the taker is the superior owner of the prop-
erty and where strategic barriers block voluntary transfers to the supe-
rior owner. In a comprehensive model of takings that looks at both pri-
vate and public takings, takings law can move beyond its excessive focus
on the nature of the ultimate owner-as exemplified in the debate over
public use-and incorporate an examination of the optimality of the
original owner, as well as the strategic barriers to voluntary transfer.
Thus, for example, by demonstrating that public ownership of the
taken property is not a necessary companion to just and efficient tak-
ings, I show that the "public use" requirement in takings law should not
be read to require that takings ultimately leave property in public hands
or that they serve a public purpose. Rather, using the work of Thomas
Merrill as an important reference point,5 I argue that the public use
requirement should be interpreted to require the efficiency or justice of
the taking.
Having made these central claims, the Article sketches out the ele-
ments of a comprehensive law of takings that encompasses both private
and public takings. This produces both theoretical and normative insights.
Normatively, the Article suggests applying a law of private takings
in fields generally seen as the domain of classic property law and regu-
lation, such as zoning. The significance of the private taking analysis
extends beyond the realm of eminent domain and property regulation.
Private takings are a significant example of an important phenomenon:
limited-application private mechanisms that can replace regulatory
structures for the provision of public goods and services. The model for
comparing the efficacy of public and private takings can thus be used in
other areas of law.
In the realm of theory, the Article circumscribes the place of tak-
ings within the broader theory of entitlements by defining takings with-
in the context of pliability rules-mixed liability and property rules-
and enables a better understanding of the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause. By showing that takings are among many acts that a nonowner
may undertake that diminish the owner's enjoyment of property rights,
a private takings analysis shows that takings law deserves to be consi-
dered alongside other ways in which the law circumscribes the transfer
25 See Merrill, 72 Cornell L Rev at 81 (cited in note 3).
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of private entitlements. Here I draw upon terminology Gideon Par-
chomovsky and I developed elsewhere6 as a refinement to the classic
typology of legal rules proposed by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Me-
lamed Calabresi and Melamed argued that legal systems typically pro-
tect legal entitlements primarily by one of two methods: property rules
that allow the entitlement holder to refuse to yield the entitlement until
she receives a price to her liking, and liability rules that force the hold-
er to yield the entitlement at a price specified by a third party, such as a
court.2 Parchomovsky and I characterized takings as relying upon a
third type of rule -a pliability rule that grants asset holders property
rule protection (or liability rule protection) until the occurrence of a
triggering event, and thereafter offers a different type of protection to
the same or a different asset holder. A taking, in this context, tempora-
rily relieves an owner of her property rule protection, and permits the
taker to take the property as if it were only protected by a liability rule.
After the taking, property rule protection returns to the asset, now in
the hands of the taker.31
Viewing takings as an institutionalized pliability rule permits us to
see its place in a larger scheme of legal protections that need not be
restricted to the government. Temporary transition to liability rule pro-
tection serves purposes that are often discussed in the literature of pri-
vate legal entitlements. It should be seen as merely one of a menu of
different kinds of hybrid protections for legal entitlements being pro-
posed by scholars. This theoretical insight helps clarify the aims of the
"just compensation" requirement and the nature of the constitutional
protection against uncompensated takings."
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I identify the central rea-
sons why a takings power is necessary and show that these reasons ap-
ply to private takings as well as public takings. In order to do so, I sur-
vey some of the major writings on takings and sharpen the definition of
26 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 Mich L Rev 1, 4-5 (2002).
27 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules; and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089,1106-10 (1972).
28 Id at 1092.
29 Id. Calabresi and Melamed also mentioned the rarer inalienability rules, which forbid
the holder to part with the entitlement altogether. See id at 1092-93.
30 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 101 Mich L Rev at 60 (cited in note 26).
31 Id. Takings thus constitute an exception to the usual pliability rule, which encompasses
an articulated expectation from the very outset.
32 See, for example, Ian Ayres and J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements As Auctions: Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 Yale L J 703, 750 (1996) (proposing the auction as one
method of managing entitlements); Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 Harv L Rev 1399,
1487-88 (2005) (discussing options as a method of managing entitlements).
33 See US Const Amend V ("[Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
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the difference between takings and other nonconsensual deprivations
of property. In Part II, I turn to the history of the law of private takings.
I show that private takings have been used throughout American legal
history and continue to be used to this day. Part III contains normative
suggestions for integrating private takings mechanisms into the law. It
develops a suggestion for comparing public and private takings, and
presents several schemes for integrating private takings into the legal
system. Part IV examines and rebuts some traditional objections to pri-
vate takings, and looks at the fit between the proposed law of private
takings and constitutional law. Part V looks to the implications of an
analysis of private takings on the broader law of takings and the theory
of entitlements.
I. A THEORY OF TAKINGS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
This Part provides an overview of the law of takings, with an eye
toward isolating the theoretical justifications for the power of takings.
I begin by discussing the origins of the law of takings. After identifying
historical justifications for the power to take, I examine modern justi-
fications. Having explicated the theory underlying the takings power, I
make three central claims. First, I show that there is an unfortunate
disconnect between the reasons underlying the takings power and
some of the doctrines that comprise the law of takings today. I then
show that a pliability analysis provides a useful prism for understanding
the nature of the takings power and circumscribing it. Finally, I show
that the justifications giving rise to a takings power, especially as un-
derstood in a pliability analysis, warrant a private takings power as well.
A. Origins of Takings
The power of the government to take property by eminent domain
is of ancient pedigree, as are limitations on that power.? For instance, in
describing the customs of kings in the Bible, the prophet Samuel in-
forms the people of Israel that the king "will take your fields, and your
vineyards, and your oliveyards, even the best of them.,,35 However,
even in biblical times, this power was apparently limited; for instance,
Ahab, the king of Israel, appears to have lacked the power to take the
vineyard of Naboth, and had to resort to fabricating charges of blas-
34 A remarkable study of the history and theoretical basis of the power of eminent domain
may be found in William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash L Rev 553
(1972) (examining the development of eminent domain from the Old Testament to the modem era).
35 1 Samuel 8:14 (King James version).
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phemy and sedition in order to confiscate the property. M Roman law too
appeared to provide for both eminent domain and some limits upon it,
though the scope of the power and its limitations remains unclear.7
The Magna Carta provided that "[n]o free man shall be ... dispos-
sessed ... except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land" and that when crown officials seized chattels, they could not "take
anyone's grain or other chattels, without immediately paying for them
in money.'
The US Constitution never explicitly grants the power of eminent
domain to the national government.3 9 However, the Fifth Amendment-
which, at the time of its adoption, applied only to the national govern-
ment-requires that "just compensation" be paid for takings,'° making
evident that such a power was assumed to be within the scope of enu-
merated powers.' Certainly, the Constitution did not abolish state pow-
ers of eminent domain, which appeared in several state constitutions.4 2
36 See 1 Kings 21:1-16 (King James version). Medieval Jewish scholars interpreted the
tension between the two sources to indicate that there was, in fact, no power to take realty. Ra-
ther, the power described by Samuel was read as a limited power to use real property temporari-
ly when required by the exigencies of war. See, for example, Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Law of
Kings 4:6, reprinted in Kings Their Wars and the Messiah 8 (Royal College of Physicians of Edin-
burgh 1987) (H.M. Russell and J. Weinberg, trans). William Stoebuck was skeptical of the link be-
tween biblical law of eminent domain and modem American law. See Stoebuck, 47 Wash L Rev
at 553 (cited in note 34) ("[Tjhere is no evidence that th[e] Biblical incident [of King Ahab's
seizure of Naboth's vineyard] contributed in the slightest to the American law of eminent do-
main, not even in Massachusetts Bay Colony in its most God fearing days.").
37 See generally J. Walter Jones, Expropriation in Roman Law, 45 L Q Rev 512 (1929)
(discussing the Romans' use of land expropriation for various purposes, including as a remedy
for economic grievances).
38 Magna Carta Arts 28,39, reprinted in Richard L. Perry and John C. Cooper, eds, Sources
of Our Liberties: Documentary Origins of Individual Liberties in the United States Constitution
and Bill of Rights 11, 16,17 (Quinn & Boden 1959).
39 For a look at the early American history of eminent domain, see generally William Michael
Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 Yale L J 694 (1985).
40 See US Const Amend V.
41 See Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the
Relationship between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 Cal L Rev 267,281 (1988)
(discussing hermeneutic implications of the Takings Clause's exclusive application to the nation-
al government). The constitutional "just compensation" limitation on the state's power of emi-
nent domain was eventually applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co v Chicago, 166 US 226,235 (1897). However, even prior to that, state law required
both just compensation and a public use for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. See
Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government. The
United States 1789-1910, 33 J Econ Hist 232,235 (1973). Interestingly, until 1875, the national gov-
ernment refrained from exercising the power of eminent domain. See Kohl v United States, 91 US
367,374 (1875).
42 See Scheiber, 33 J Econ Hist at 237-40 (cited in note 41). See also Stoebuck, 47 Wash L
Rev at 555 (cited in note 34).
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Historically, there were two central justifications for eminent do-
main. 3 First, eminent domain was seen as intrinsic to the power of gov-
ernment." This, indeed, is the origin of the term "eminent domain"; Hu-
go Grotius believed the eminent power of the ruler encompassed the
right to assert his domain over property." Thus, takings could be justi-
fied by resort to royal prerogative, or, more generally, to the powers of
the central government. Here, eminent domain did not serve any par-
ticular purpose. It was simply part of the nature of the Leviathan. 1
This, for example, appears to be the justification for the takings power
cited by the prophet Samuel. A sovereign government, on this view,
was created to serve the needs of a society that selected a powerful so-
vereign in order to avoid the "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short"
life in the state of nature." Sovereignty necessarily entailed certain
powers, including the power to take away property.
Second, eminent domain could be seen as incidental to the grant of
property rights. Here, the underlying claim was that there were no natu-
ral property rights, except at the sufferance of the sovereign. The root of
all title was in the sovereign, and the sovereign could "reclaim" its
property at any time. Sometimes, this justification would be explicit;
land grants might specifically include a clause permitting the govern-
ment to seize part of the property. For instance, in colonial Pennsylva-
nia, land grants included an "additional" 6 percent which could be taken
by the state in order to build roads." Indeed, this set-aside in the land
grant was later interpreted by the state Supreme Court to permit un-
compensated takings, since the "taken" property was implicitly already
at the disposal of the state.4'9 But, more broadly, the government's tak-
ings power could be seen as implicit in the grant of legal protection for
any property. Even without an explicit clause in the land grant or other
43 See Treanor, 94 Yale L J at 694 (cited in note 39).
44 See, for example, Kohl, 91 US at 371.
45 See Hugo Grotius, Hugonis Grotii De Jure Belli et Pacis: Libri Tres 326 (Cambridge
1853) (William Whewell, trans). This appears to be the explanation for the takings power
adopted by Richard Epstein. See Epstein, Takings at 331-34 (cited in note 3) (asserting that
while the state qua state has no independent set of entitlements, the power of eminent domain is
necessary for the state to exist as more than a "voluntary protective association").
46 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 125,225,228 (Cambridge 1991) (Robert Tuck, ed).
47 Idat 113.
48 See M'Clenechan v Curwen, 3 Yeates 362, 366 (1802).
49 Id. A version of the colonial set-aside remains part of Pennsylvania law and is used today
to justify private takings See, for example, In re Opening Private Road, 954 A2d 57,72 (Pa Commw
Ct 2008) (holding that the Private Road Act, which permits owners of landlocked property to take
rights of way to nearby roads, does not allow unconstitutional takings, because the colonial-era
set-aside created "an incorporeal burden on those whose lands the private road is to traverse").
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legal instrument giving rise to property rights, everyone "knew" that her
property was subject to an implicit "take-back" clause.-
B. Modern Justifications for Takings
These two traditional explanations of the takings power are, at least
today, quite unsatisfying. Pointing to takings as an incident of govern-
mental power is, at best, an allusion to an anachronism, and, at worst, a
circular argument." The fact that takings might be thought to have been
an unavoidable part of the package of powers granted to a sovereign
power in seventeenth-century political theory hardly commends itself
as a reason to recognize a power of eminent domain today.52
Arguing for a takings power on the grounds of an implicit gov-
ernment power contained within the property is, at least ontologically,
more satisfying, in that it appears to advance a reason for the takings
power. However, the reason offered by this account disappears upon
closer inspection. First, the right to define property does not necessari-
ly imply the right to redefine. Indeed, unlimited powers to redefine
property significantly undermine one of the central virtues of defined
property rights -their ability to stabilize and protect expectations con-
cerning assets.3 Second, even conceding a government power to rede-
fine property or to insert its own right to take within the initial defined
right does not offer a reason for that power to be exercised. The "can"
does not imply the "ought." The implicit government power account
does not explain why the government ought to exercise any given tak-
ings power. Third, viewing property in this way eviscerates the distinc-
tion between the concepts of sovereignty and ownership. Since all
property is subject to the superior claims of government and may be
taken at any time, private property ceases to exist vis-A-vis the govern-
ment." Fourth, and finally, the assumption of absolute government
50 See Harry N. Scheiber, The Jurisprudence-and Mythology-of Eminent Domain in
American Legal History, in Ellen Frankel Paul and Howard Dickman, eds, Liberty, Property and
Government Constitutional Interpretation before the New Deal 217,222-23 (SUNY 1989).
51 Consider Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457,469 (1897):
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the
time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
52 Recently, the Supreme Court expressed its disapproval of state attempts to place overly
"potent [ ] Hobbesian stick[s] into the Lockean bundle." Palazzolo v Rhode Island, 533 US 606,
627 (2001).
53 For a more detailed discussion of the importance of stability value to the law of property, see
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L Rev 531,552 (2005).
54 Indeed, much of the development of Anglo-American property law was aimed at pre-
venting the king from asserting his theoretical rights as owner over all land held by others in mere
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power to define (and redefine) property is belied by both modern
economic and psychological accounts. Specifically, economic theory
instructs us that even in the absence of government definitions of
property rights, de facto rights to extract value from assets will emerge
from markets where the rights are sufficiently valuable.55 Empirical
psychological studies have demonstrated that ownership feelings are
so basic to human psyches that communities will produce rudimentary
property rights even in the absence of legal structures.
Modern explanations of the takings power thus focus on prag-
matic, rather than formalistic, reasons for permitting the government
to appropriate certain private property for public use. One set of
modern justifications focuses on concerns of distributive justice. The
other looks to economic or planning efficiency.
Justifications based in distributive justice see property claims as
contingent on and subject to societal claims for redistribution and real-
location of burdens.57 This genre of justifications insists upon the reci-
procal duties and responsibilities created by the social institution of
property. Government, as society's representative, uses the power of
takings to assert society's latent claims. Through the takings power,
property rights bow to claims of justice asserted by the community of
persons for whom property rights are created. In a way, this justification
for the power of takings is similar to the formalist explanations for emi-
nent domain. It looks both to the inherent powers of the government
(as representative of the interests of society) and to the contingency of
property rights (as subject to the prior claims of government). However,
in contrast to the formalist accounts of the power of eminent domain,
the justice account is not absolute. Property owners must yield to other
claimants where justice so demands, rather than as a matter of inferior
power. Thus, it cannot be said that all property is ultimately owned by
the government. Rather, the government, as a representative of socie-
ty, takes part in the web of all property relations attached to any given
object. This relation may or may not give rise to a just taking, depend-
ing on the circumstances of the case.
"tenancies" See A.WB. Simpson, A History of the Land Law 47 (Oxford 2d ed 1986); Richard
Pipes, Property and Freedom 123 (Knopf 1999).
55 See generally Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights (Cambridge 2d ed 1997).
56 See, for example, Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental
Patients and Other Inmates 18-21, 244-54 (1961) (discussing the evolution of ad hoc property
regimes within mental institutions).
57 See Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 Va L Rev 741,791-92 (1999).
58 This conception should lead "liberal property" conceptualists to favor absolute limita-
tions on the right to take property. Where "fair," the taking should be permitted, even without
compensation; where "unfair," the taking should be forbidden, even with compensation. Consid-
er Margaret J. Radin, Reinterpreting Property 136-37 (Chicago 1993) (arguing that takings juri-
sprudence is incompatible with current limitations on property and freedom).
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This justice-based account of the takings power can be illustrated
by the following example. Consider Alice, who owns a large land es-
tate that serves as an important rest stop for several endangered spe-
cies of migratory birds. Alice's interest in her property should be seen
as both a source of claims over other members of society and implicit-
ly subject to the other societal claimants. The government (through
the legal system) prevents trespassers from using Alice's estate but
also demands that Alice bow to other interests of society in preserving
endangered species. The land, in other words, is considered Alice's
"property" because Alice has entered into the web of relationships
vis-h-vis society and the government, which allows Alice certain kinds
of exclusivity regarding the land but also demands that Alice provide
for certain kinds of public needs in the land. In this case, a government
taking of the property to create a wildlife and fowl preserve would be
a just use of the takings power. A government taking simply to enrich
Alice's neighbor Barbara, who is similarly situated to Alice, would not
satisfy this justice requirement.
Efficiency claims for the takings power focus on a different set of
factors. In the efficiency account, the takings power is necessary to allow
government to fulfill its important function of providing public goods,"9
and, more specifically, warranted by the need to overcome strategic
barriers that would block the government's consensual acquisition of
such property as would be used in the provision of the public good. The
claim rests on the idea that there are times when it is ideal for the gov-
ernment to own property in order, for example, to ensure its preserva-
tion, or because the government is the highest-value user. Sometimes,
the government will be able to purchase such property on the open
market; at other times, however, impediments to bargaining prevent
owners from voluntarily reassigning the asset to the government.
59 See Epstein, Takings at 4-5 (cited in note 3) (arguing that the state can only validly
exercise coercive power to prevent private aggression or to provide public goods). See also
Thomas W. Merrill, Book Review, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw U L Rev
1561,1569 (1986), reviewing Epstein, Takings (cited in note 3):
[Wihen the power of eminent domain is used to supply public goods, the surplus will tend
to be divided, at least approximately, in proportion to preexisting shares of wealth[:] Those
with large preexisting shares will obtain large benefits from public goods; those with small
preexisting shares will obtain small benefits,
Consider also Ugo Mattei, Efficiency As Equity: Insights from Comparative Law and Economics,
14 Intl Rev L & Econ 3,7 (1994):
As far as the public use requirement is concerned, the economic theory of public goods
provides both a justification and a limit. The justification is that the government needs to be
able to acquire the inputs that are necessary to provide public goods which the market can-
not easily provide. The limit is set by the consideration that any private use of the power of
eminent domain will be inefficient since it produces a result that private parties were not
able to reach by bargaining.
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Strategic behavior poses the central barrier to successful negotia-
tions overcome by eminent domain. Such behavior includes the close-
ly related problems of holdouts, bilateral monopoly, and asymmetric
information.-
In a situation of bilateral monopoly, the market consists of one
buyer and one seller. Each knows that the transaction cannot take place
without her cooperation; and each, therefore, attempts to extract all the
profit from the transaction. The problem of bilateral monopoly can be
illustrated with the example of a government decision to build a reser-
voir in a valley owned by a single individual. There is only one reser-
voir, and therefore only one potential buyer of valley land. There is
also only one seller. Both the landowner and the government know
that the government wishes to purchase the valley for the reservoir,
that there are no other locations in which the reservoir may be placed,
and that there is no other market for the valley owner. Both buyer and
seller need each other, but, ironically, this fact may well foil the sale.
Each knows that there is profit to be made in transferring the land to
the government, and each side will try to maximize its own share of the
profit. In such a situation, the price is unknowable ex ante, transaction
costs may become prohibitive, and the attempt to out-strategize the
opponent may foil the project altogether.
60 See Eric L. Talley, Note, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated
Damages Rule, 46 Stan L Rev 1195, 1198, 1219-20 (1994) (discussing the problem of bilateral
monopoly in contract renegotiation); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rule5; Coase, and Intellectual
Property, 94 Colum L Rev 2655,2659-60 (1994) (observing that the valuation problem heightens
the possibility of strategic bargaining in the field of intellectual property); John Kerman and
Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private Information, 31 J Econ Lit 45, 46 (1993) (hypothesizing
that differences in private information are a primary cause of delays in bargaining); Robert
Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J Legal Stud 1, 23 (1982) (reviewing the literature and noting that
disagreements as to how to divide the contractual surplus may prevent successful Coasean bar-
gaining). On asymmetric information specifically, see Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner, and Ri-
chard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw
U L Rev 91,109 (2000) (defining "asymmetric information" as a situation in which "one party to
a contract ... has more information about future states of the world than does the other party");
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and
Talley, 105 Yale L J 221,223 (1995):
When each party's own valuation is not known by the other, each party will have incentives
to misrepresent its valuation in bargaining, hoping to extract more of the bargaining surplus
from the other party. Parties may therefore demand too much or offer too little, with the re-
sult that efficient bargains may not be reached.
Compare William Samuelson, A Comment on the Coase Theorem, in Alvin E. Roth, ed, Game-
theoretic Models of Bargaining 321, 331-35 (Cambridge 1985) (arguing that if an entitlement is
auctioned in a particular way between the parties rather than allocated through bargaining, the
problems associated with asymmetric information and bargaining can be overcome, but ac-
knowledging that his proposed auctions may be impracticable because they would require the
initial entitlement holder to share the proceeds). See also generally Richard A. Posner, Econom-
icAnalysis of Law 55 (Aspen 6th ed 2003).
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Holdout problems are similar. Imagine that the land in the valley is
owned by a number of private individuals. The government must now
purchase for the reservoir all the valley parcels in the drainage basin;
even one holdout in the middle of the planned reservoir can ruin the
project. Each parcel owner is thus a monopolist who may attempt to hold
out for a higher price that will divert the reservoir profits to her own
pockets. Again, strategic considerations may block the transaction.61
Eminent domain provides the solution to the strategic difficulties
raised by both bilateral monopoly and holdout.' The takings power
permits the government to take the parcels of land in the valley by
eminent domain and then open them for use by the reservoir.
The problem of asymmetric information is particularly important in
this regard. Private entities may often overcome the holdout difficulty by
using straw agents or the like to hide their plans. However, in standard
accounts, it is far more difficult for the government to hide its plans.6 Par-
cel owners possess knowledge of the government plans, while the gov-
ernment can only guess at the owners' true reserve price. This leads the
parcel owners to engage in strategic behavior and rent-seeking and
burdens the opportunity to successfully negotiate a transaction.6
The takings power resolves these dilemmas by eliminating the
need for negotiations. Where subject to the just compensation require-
ment, the government may simply acquire the property for fair market
value, notwithstanding the fact that -at least with respect to this buyer
and seller-the market for this property is not functioning. '
C. Physical Takings, Regulatory Takings, and Other Takings
The power of eminent domain does not exhaust the powers of
government vis-A-vis property. Government may tax, and it may tax
61 For a discussion of the differences between holdouts and the oft-related phenomenon of
free riding, see generally Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders; 20 J Leg Stud 351 (1991).
62 See Thomas . Miceli and Kathleen Segerson, A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and
Takings, 9 Am L & Econ Rev 160, 169-71 (2007) (illustrating how even the threat of eminent
domain from a developer can be a solution to the problem of holdouts).
63 See Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law at 124-32 (cited in note 3) (discuss-
ing the complications that arise when the state attempts to acquire property through purchase).
64 For discussion of informational justifications for eminent domain, see Christopher T.
Wonnell, The Structure of a General Theory of Nondisclosure, 41 Case W Res L Rev 329,360-62
(1991) (noting that while nondisclosure prevents opportunism, it also may tax one's morality);
Levmore, 68 Va L Rev at 142-44 (cited in note 3) (weighing the informational justifications for
eminent domain to gain insight into the appropriate level of regulation for insider trading).
65 Determining market price for taken property is often extraordinarily difficult. See, for
example, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 Stan L
Rev 871, 885-90 (2007). This is hardly surprising, given that market failure is the basis of the
decision to take.
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property, just as it may tax income or people.6 Government may also
establish crimes and punishments, and it may confiscate property as a
punishment or to prevent it from being used as the instrumentality of a
crime.6 And, most importantly for our purposes, there are a host of gov-
ernment powers to regulate property in the interests of public health,
safety, and welfare, generally referred to as "police powers." Regulato-
ry powers, in particular, have presented a particular dilemma to theor-
ists of takings. On its face, seizing property through eminent domain
involves the appropriation of all of the sticks in the bundle of rights6
previously owned by the property holder, while, in regulating, the gov-
ernment may take only a portion of those sticks. But, in reality, eminent
domain may often involve a less-than-complete appropriation, while
regulatory powers may accomplish functionally complete appropria-
tion. Consequently, the government may often accomplish the function-
al equivalent of a taking, without ever claiming to exercise the power of
eminent domain. For example, the government may take all the air
rights over a certain parcel of land by eminent domain.7' It may also
forbid all owner use of such air rights by means of the regulatory power,
while retaining overflight rights for itself, functionally accomplishing the
same purpose as taking the air rights, but under a different name.
This dilemma led Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in the landmark
1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal Company v Mahon," to establish that
66 See Eduardo Mois6s Pefhalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 Colum L Rev 2182, 2183-84
(2004) (discussing the vague distinction between taxes and takings).
67 See, for example, Bennis v Michigan, 516 US 442, 452-53 (1996) (upholding seizure by
the state of a jointly owned automobile in which a husband committed sexual activity with a
prostitute, and holding that his wife was not entitled to "just compensation" under the Takings
Clause for loss of her ownership interest).
68 See Laurence H.Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 7-3 at 554 (Foundation 2d ed 1988).
69 For descriptions of property as a "bundle of rights," see, for example, Edward H. Rabin, et
al, Fundamentals of Modern Property Law 1, 22 (Foundation 4th ed 2000); Joseph William Singer,
Introduction to Property 2 (Aspen 2000); Gregory S. Alexander, Commodity & Propriety: Com-
peting Visions of Property in American Legal Thought, 1776-1970 319-23,381-82 (Chicago 1997);
Nancie G. Marzulla and Roger J. Marzulla, Property Rights: Understanding Government Takings
and Environmental Regulation 11-12 (Government Institutes 1997); J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of
Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L Rev 711, 712 (1996); William A. Fischel, Regulatory
Takings: Law, Economics and Politics 2 (Harvard 1995); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-
o-stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 Mich L Rev 239,239 (1994); Jesse
Dukeminier and James E. Krier, Property 86 (3d ed 1993); John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in
Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property, 1986 U Ill L Rev 1,1; Kenneth J. Vande-
velde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modem Concept of
Property, 29 Buff L Rev 325,357-67 (1980).
70 See United States v Causby, 328 US 256,266-67 (1946).
71 See Penn Central v New York City, 438 US 104, 138 (1978). For a broader discussion of
the ability to use nontakings powers to accomplish substantially the same objective, see Bell and
Parchomovsky, 106 Colum L Rev at 1434 (cited in note 2).
72 260 US 393 (1922).
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"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."73 Determining when
precisely a regulation has gone so far as to create a regulatory taking
has proved to be one of the more insoluble legal questions of the last
half-century. It continues to puzzle scholars, judges, and practitioners
alike." The distinctions between takings, taxes, and punishments have
produced a less voluminous scholarly literature; however, the dividing
lines are no clearer.75
At least formally, the constitutional law of takings and regulatory
takings do not serve the same purpose. The central constitutional limita-
tion on the takings power-the just compensation requirement-does
not forbid takings; it merely requires a payment to accompany the
taking. The law of regulatory takings is slightly different. Arguably
based in notions of the contract clause or substantive due process, the
regulatory takings limitation forbids altogether certain exercises of the
regulatory power. Such regulations as go "too far" are no longer valid
regulations, and their aims must be accomplished through a different
power: the power of eminent domain." Functionally, however, this
formal difference is meaningless. Whether expressed as an exercise of
eminent domain as the result of an unconstitutional regulation or as a
regulation with compensation, ultimately the government act is the
same. The government may take property by explicit use of eminent
domain or effectively take it through eminent domain expressed as a
regulation, so long as the taking is accompanied by just compensation.
73 Idat415.
74 See Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the Supreme Court Been
Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 Urb L 307, 308
(1998) ("The incoherence of the U.S. Supreme Court's output in this field has by now been dem-
onstrated time and again by practitioners and academic commentators ad nauseam, and I refuse
to add to the ongoing gratuitous slaughter of trees for the paper consumed in this frustrating and
increasingly pointless enterprise."); Daniel Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 Const
Comment 279, 279 (1992) ("There is no consensus today about takings law-only a general
belief that the takings problem is difficult and that takings doctrine is a mess.").
75 See generally, for example, Pefialver, Regulatory Taxings (cited in note 66).
76 See Mahon, 260 US at 413 (holding that substantial diminution of value may constitute a
taking under eminent domain). Justice Holmes's opinion is characteristically vague in identifying
the sources of the regulatory takings doctrine. However, the emphasis on distinguishing legiti-
mate exercises of the police power from exercises of eminent domain suggests that the regulatory
takings doctrine operates in concert with substantive due process; a regulation that violates the
substantive due process is no longer a valid exercise of the police power, but if the regulation ab-
ides by the requirements of the substantive Due Process Clause, there has been no taking. See
Kenneth Salzberg, The Dog That Didn't Bark: Assessing Damages for Valid Regulatory Takings,
46 Natural Resources J 131,134-35 (2006).
77 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v County of Los Angeles, 482
US 304, 321-22 (1987) (discussing whether courts have the authority to force government to take
property through eminent domain when it has chosen to take through uncompensated regulation).
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D. The Inadequacies of Takings Law
Thus far, I have described the modern accounts for the takings
power on the grounds of justice or efficiency. In each case, I showed
how the account purported to show that the government should be
granted a claim in the property superior to that of the prior owner,
either because the government is a more just or because it is a more
efficient owner.
To further examine these accounts, it is important to see that jus-
tifying the power of takings involves two issues, not one. First, the tak-
ings power allows the government to acquire property on the basis of
a presumed superior claim in justice or efficiency. Second, the takings
power allows that acquisition to be accomplished through the unusual
mechanism of taking with compensation, rather than through a con-
sensual transaction. In other words, the takings power is warranted
only where two issues are resolved in favor of the government: (1) the
government is the preferred owner for reasons of justice or efficiency,
and (2) coercion is the preferred transfer mechanism. By bifurcating
the concerns of takings in this way, we can see that contemporary tak-
ings law does a poor job with regards to both issues. Specifically, cur-
rent doctrinal limitations of the takings power fail to limit properly its
use to cases where the government is both the superior owner and its
ownership should be obtained through coercion."
1. Government as a superior owner.
I begin with an examination of the first issue: when the govern-
ment is the preferred owner. Subject only to the often toothless "public
use" requirement and the payment of "just compensation," the govern-
ment may take any property it wants. Thus, there is nothing in the law of
takings that limits the power to take to those cases where the govern-
ment is the preferred owner on the grounds of justice or efficiency.
Consider the following two cases. In the first case, the government seeks
to preserve a unique habitat for an endangered species, and it can ac-
complish this mission cost efficiently by owning the land. In the second
case, the government seeks to improve airline safety, which can best be
accomplished by leaving airlines to private ownership, subject to public
inspections. Nevertheless, in response to a public panic about inade-
quate air safety, the government seeks a governmental monopoly on the
provision of air transportation services, notwithstanding the likelihood
that the scheme will cause considerable economic inefficiency and dis-
78 See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 57-58 (cited in note 60) (discussing the
ways in which the eminent domain power systematically underestimates or ignores subjective value).
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location, without appreciable change in safety, or public confidence.9
Ideally, in the first case, the takings power should pave the way to gov-
ernment ownership of the property; in the second case, it should not.
Yet, the takings power does not distinguish between the cases.
One might argue that such a distinction can be implied in the
constitutional requirement that takings be accompanied by a public
use.'o On this argument, a proposed taking would lack a public use-
and therefore be unconstitutional -where the government is not itself
the higher-value (or more just) user of the property. In the two hypo-
thetical cases above, the taking for habitat preservation would be justi-
fied by a public use and the taking for air transport monopoly would
not. Yet, this interpretation of the constitutional public use require-
ment is clearly not reflected in current law.
The public use limitation on the takings power has long been in-
terpreted extremely narrowly.8' Indeed, in recent years, the public use
requirement has effectively disappeared from federal law.2
79 For the sake of the hypothetical, I am assuming that there is either a disparity between
the public's ex ante and ex post confidence in government monopolies, or that the government
misreads the public desire. These examples are intended to be purely hypothetical. In describing
the cases, I am not suggesting either that it is desirable for the government to own property for
species conservation or that it is undesirable for the government to own air transportation assets.
I am also not making any suggestions about whether the government should be restricted, constitu-
tionally or otherwise, from exercising its powers on the basis of popular, if misguided, sentiment, or
indeed about whether popular sentiment should be subject to questions about its wisdom.
80 Compare Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165,1214 (1967) (discussing a utilita-
rian model for takings, in which the highest-value user should be the one who possesses the land,
based on a consideration of efficiency gains, demoralization costs, and settlement costs), with
Donald J. Kochan, Public Use and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-group
Perspective, 3 Tex Rev L & Policy 49 (1998) (calling for reinterpreting the Takings Clause to
reduce private rent-seeking).
81 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 190 n 5 (Yale 1977)
("[Tihe modern understanding of 'public use' holds that any state purpose otherwise constitu-
tional should qualify as sufficiently 'public' to justify a taking.").
82 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of
Servitudes, 55 S Cal L Rev 1353, 1367 n 29 (1982) (observing that "the public use limitation has
little, if any, constitutional bite today, except in cases involving the condemnation of excess
land"). This development has prompted protest from some scholars. See, for example, Merrill, 72
Cornell L Rev at 61 (cited in note 3) (critiquing the decline of the public use requirement in
takings jurisprudence); Epstein, Takings at 161-81 (cited in note 3) (declaring that the definition
of "public use" has become so broad that it might as well be invisible); Gideon Kanner, Con-
demnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48 Notre Dame Lawyer 765, 765-66
(1973). See also generally Bell and Parchomovsky, 106 Colum L Rev at 1413 (cited in note 2)
(explaining liberal and conservative objections to the expansion of public use). Interestingly, at
least as a matter of grammar, the phrasing of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause actually
suggests that "public use" is a condition precedent of the payment of "just compensation" rather
than of the exercise of the taking power. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American
Law 1780-1860 65 (1977) (citing arguments of nineteenth-century lawyers that similar provisions
in state constitutions did not limit power to take for private use). That is, the language of the
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Particularly in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo,
affirming the deferential reading of public use," there have been wide-
spread calls for a revival of some version of the public use limitation,
especially where the takings power is used for the benefit of private
parties. ' And, indeed, the public use limitation has already enjoyed a
limited revival at the state level.8' However, aside from one fascinating
proposal by Thomas Merrill some twenty years ago,6 these arguments
have generally not been extended into a claim that a public use is
lacking unless the government is the more efficient or just owner of
the property to be taken.
The other constitutional limitation on the takings power-the re-
quirement of just compensation-is similarly unlikely to ensure that
property will be taken only where the government is the more efficient
user. It is true, of course, that the payment of just compensation requires
the government to internalize one measure of the cost of its taking.
And, if the government were properly viewed as a wealth-maximizing
private individual, the compensation requirement might be enough to
lead the government to limit its takings to cases where it was the higher-
value user of the property. However, in the final analysis, the just com-
pensation requirement cannot be expected, in itself, to properly limit
the takings power. First, there is good reason to suspect that the gov-
ernment does not act like a wealth-maximizing individual. Second, even
if it did so act, the practical limitations faced by courts in measuring
compensation create a situation where the government may often take,
even though it is not the ideal owner of the property.
Let us examine each of these factors in turn. I turn first to the ques-
tion of whether the government can be treated as a wealth-maximizing
actor. If the government did act like a wealth-maximizing private indi-
vidual, it would consciously or unconsciously exercise the takings power
only after determining that the taking would produce a net benefit. On
the benefit side, the government would place the value to it of the
property to be taken. On the cost side, the government would place the
Fifth Amendment suggests that the government may take property even absent a public use, but
need pay compensation only when it takes the property for a public use. Traditionally, the Tak-
ings Clause has not been so read; instead it has been thought to embody the Anglo-American
tradition of limiting the power of eminent domain to cases where the taking is for a public use.
See, for example, Kelo, 545 US at 477-78.
83 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 106 Colum L Rev at 1413 (cited in note 2). See also Kelo,
545 US at 489-90.
84 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 106 Colum L Rev at 1413 (cited in note 2).
85 See, for example, Hathcock, 684 NW2d at 787 (purporting to overrule Poletown); Bailey
v Myers, 76 P3d 898, 904 (Ariz 2003) (ruling that seizure of property for redevelopment into
privately owned retail, office, and restaurant facilities does not satisfy "public use").
86 Merrill, 72 Cornell L Rev at 92-93 (cited in note 3) (presenting a model that evaluates
public use based on whether or not the government is the highest-value user).
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expected value of the compensation to be paid. If the value of the bene-
fits exceeded the value of the costs, the government would take the
property; otherwise, the government would refrain from exercising its
power. Given that the compensation is supposed to reflect the value of
the property in the hands of the pretaking owner, the government's cal-
culation as a wealth-maximizer would lead it to precisely the right result:
exercising its takings power only where it was the higher-value user.
In practice, however, the government is not a wealth-maximizing
individual. Government is not a monolith, and the incentives acting
upon governmental decisionmakers almost certainly do not lead to a
wealth-maximizing decisionmaking process.7 This is not to say, of
course, that the financial cost or benefit of any given decision is irrele-
vant to the government. On the contrary, the government's decision-
making process is likely influenced by "fiscal illusion," that is, by the
effect of that decision on the government's budget, rather than on the
public welfare as a whole.8 Nevertheless, the budgetary concern is not
the only grounds for decisions. Government decisionmakers are agents
with their own agendas and welfare functions. Whether elected officials
seeking reelection or bureaucrats seeking to enhance their likelihood
of landing a plum job with the "clients" after retirement from public
service, government decisionmakers will pursue their own goals.8
Thus, while the compensation requirement will lead government-as
an institution-to internalize the costs of its takings, it will not neces-
sarily lead the agents making decisions on behalf of that institution to
efficient choices.
Moreover, even if we were to assume that the government acts
like a wealth-maximizing individual, we should not expect the just
compensation requirement to provide an adequate guarantee of good
decisions in all cases. Compensation in takings law is generally made
according to the property's market value, rather than its value to its
current owner. In addition, compensation is not made for various
87 See generally Dennis Mueller, Public Choice III (Cambridge 2003).
88 For evidence concerning fiscal illusion's impact on government decisionmaking, see
Geoffrey K. Turnbull, The Overspending and Flypaper Effects of Fiscal Illusion: Theory and
Empirical Evidence, 44 J Urban Econ 1, 22-23 (1998) (indicating that the complexity of the
budget plays an important role in determining government spending, as the complex budget
makes it difficult for voters to determine the effect of a proposed spending item on the budget as
a whole); George W. Downs and Patrick D. Larkey, The Search for Government Efficiency: From
Hubris to Helplessness 125-27 (Random 1986) (arguing that agencies and individuals can mani-
pulate government decisionmaking by inflating benefits and deflating costs, regardless of the
public good produced by the projects in question); Joseph J. Cordes and Burton A. Weisbrod,
Governmental Behavior in Response to Compensation Requirements, 11 J Pub Econ 47, 56-57
(1979) (showing that compensation requirements can restrict efficient takings by forcing gov-
ernment agencies to consider budgetary requirements rather than social benefits).
89 See generally Mueller, Public Choice III (cited in note 87).
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types of damages such as goodwill and consequential damages.90 Con-
sequently, even if the government must pay compensation for taken
property, it may still take inefficiently, where the government values
the property more than the market, but less than the current owner.
In short, the law of takings - at least as currently constituted -fails
to ensure that the takings power will be used only when the govern-
ment is the higher-value or preferred user of the property to be taken.
2. Takings and strategic behavior.
In addition to the question of the higher-value user, takings law
involves a second aspect: it allows the government to take the proper-
ty through coercion, rather than through the usual consensual me-
chanism. And, again, takings law fails to ensure that this coercive tool
is used only when necessary. As I noted earlier, subject to the public use
restriction and the payment of "just compensation," the government
may always take, irrespective of the presence of strategic barriers to
bargaining. The public use requirement, we have seen, presents no use-
ful guidelines at all, and certainly does not help distinguish between
cases where coercion should be preferred to consent.9' And, while there
will be cases where the just compensation requirement deters the gov-
ernment from exercising its power to take, there is little reason to sus-
pect an automatic correlation between those cases and cases where the
absence of strategic problems should bar government takings.
Consider again the case of the government taking of a habitat for
an endangered species. First, let us suppose that the endangered spe-
cies in question is a sand-dwelling creature that can flourish anywhere
on the coast of the eastern seaboard of the United States. There are
thousands of private parcels of land that could serve as protected ha-
bitat for the creature. In such a circumstance, it is difficult to imagine
that there would be serious strategic barriers to negotiating government
acquisition of a suitable parcel of conservation property. If one property
owner were to attempt to hold out for a share of the expected public
"profit" in saving the endangered species, or as a result of an idiosyn-
cratic subjective value she attaches to her land, the government could
turn to a large number of other landowners as alternative suppliers of
the desired habitat.
90 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 59 Stan L Rev at 885-90 (cited in note 65).
91 Arguably, some state constitutional public use doctrines may come closer to limiting the
takings power to those cases where coercion is necessary. In Hathcock, the court offered three
categories of cases in which public takings on behalf of private entities would be found to have a
public use. See 684 NW2d at 782. The first of these categories is "cases [ ] in which collective
action is needed to acquire land for vital instrumentalities of commerce." Id.
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Yet, nothing in the law of takings prevents the government from
using the coercive mechanism even in such cases where there are no
barriers to consensual property transfers. Once again, neither the pub-
lic use restriction nor the just compensation requirement limits the
exercise of the takings power to those cases where it is necessary. Ra-
ther, the law of takings leaves the unfettered use of the takings power
to the discretion of the government.
The inability of the public use limitation-as currently interpreted-
to limit nonconsensual takings should be evident. As noted earlier, in
practical terms, the public use restriction is toothless; for purposes of the
takings power, everything is a public use.? Even in the more restrictive
version of the public use doctrine adopted by several states, and sug-
gested in post-Kelo legislative proposals, takings are generally permit-
ted without distinguishing between cases when coercive methods
should be used for obtaining property and those in which consensual
methods should be preferred. Rather, public use is determined by the
eventual purpose to which the taken property will be put." One might
imagine an alternative public use doctrine that restricted exercises of
the takings power to situations in which strategic problems or other
market failures demand the use of a coercive mechanism for govern-
ment acquisitions of property. However, that proposed public use doc-
trine is clearly not the one currently in force. Indeed, it is even further
removed from scholarly discussion of the public use requirement than
my earlier hypothetical public use doctrine, which required the gov-
ernment to be the highest-value or most just user.
The just compensation requirement places a more substantial re-
striction on the government's use of its coercive powers. Indeed, if one
were to assume that it is always substantially more expensive for the
acquirer to use the takings power than to engage in market transactions,
then the just compensation clause would successfully limit exercises of
the takings power to cases where coercion is necessary. If coercion were
always more expensive for it, the government would always use the
cheaper alternative of voluntary purchase where available.
However, coercion is frequently the less expensive option for the
government. When the government chooses between purchase and tak-
ing, it also chooses between two types of attendant costs. Purchasing
property is attended by contracting costs-the costs of negotiating the
deal. Taking by eminent domain is accompanied by litigation costs.
92 See note 82 and accompanying text. See also Part IV.B.1.
93 See, for example, Idaho Code Ann § 7-701A (West) ("Eminent domain shall not be used
to acquire private property: (a) For any alleged public use which is merely a pretext for the
transfer of the condemned property or any interest in that property to a private party; or (b) For
the purpose of promoting or effectuating economic development.").
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Where litigation costs predominate, consensual transfers will be cheap-
er; where contracting costs predominate, nonconsensual takings will be
more cost-effective. The takings power is insensitive to these concerns
and permits taking irrespective of attendant costs. And since many of
the attendant costs fall on the property owner rather than the govern-
ment, it is quite conceivable that the government will choose the ineffi-
cient means of obtaining property.N Thus, the law of takings fails to en-
sure that the government's power of eminent domain will be exercised
only where coercion is the preferred method of acquiring property.
E. Takings and Pliability
Thus far, I have discussed the takings power in connection with a
specific issue: the incompatibility of the justifications for the govern-
ment's takings power with the actual law governing it. I now look to
the broader implications of situating takings within a broader entitle-
ment analysis and characterizing takings in terms of pliability rules.
As we have seen so far, the takings power permits the government
to acquire private property or other entitlements by exercising eminent
domain and paying compensation. This power permits the government
to avoid the usual rules protecting entitlements in the private market
and force a nonmarket transfer to the government. To understand the
implications of this power, it is necessary to examine the usual struc-
ture of legal protection of entitlements.
In Calabresi and Melamed's classic typology, entitlements can be
classified by the type of legal protection governing transfers of the en-
titlement. Liability rule protection leaves the entitlement open to invo-
luntary seizures by all; other parties may transfer to themselves the
benefit of the entitlement in exchange for a payment determined by a
third party such as a court.9 Property rule protection grants the entitle-
ment holder a right to veto involuntary transfers and restricts transfer
to cases where the entitlement holder agrees on a price with the trans-
feree.9 Inalienability rule protection bars transfer altogether.9 Pliability
rules, according to Parchomovsky's and my refinement of the Calabresi-
Melamed taxonomy, specify multiple stages of protection in which spe-
94 See Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J Polit Econ 473,488
(1976) (demonstrating that different cost structures for government and property owners lead to
systematic undercompensation for low-value property and overcompensation for high-value
property).
95 Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1092 (cited in note 27).
96 Id.
97 Id at 1092-93.
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cified events or actions trigger a change in protection-for example,
from property to liability."
Analyzed within this framework, the power of eminent domain
serves as the trigger in a pliability rule that defends an asset by property
rule protection, then liability, and finally property again. Declaration of
a taking temporarily transfers protection over the target asset from a
property rule to a liability rule, thereby allowing the taker to take the
entitlement of ownership over the asset. However, once the transfer has
taken place, the liability rule protection disappears and is replaced once
again by property rule protection. The asset-now owned by the gov-
ernment-may not be taken by another in exchange for compensation
determined by a third party. Rather, the government has veto rights
over future transfers. Therefore, the government may, for example, sell
the taken property to another party and convey the usual set of rights,
backed by property rule protection.
A pliability analysis allows the incorporation of an insight made
earlier by Louis Kaplow and others: nothing prevents entitlement hold-
ers from being aware of the risk of a government taking or valuing their
entitlement accordingly.9 In a pliability analysis, entitlement holders
should view their asset as enjoying property rule protection only until
the government decides to exercise its right to eminent domain. The
decision to exercise the power of eminent domain triggers a change
from property rule to liability rule protection. Whereas earlier the gov-
ernment could only acquire the property via consensual transaction, it
may now take it in exchange for the payment of "just compensation."
The uncertainty and flaws in compensation in the event of an involuntary
taking will be reflected in the internal owner valuation and the price.
Viewing takings in this way enables us to see that the power of
eminent domain is not quite so alien to the private market as we
might suspect. Pliability rules are hardly unknown to the private sec-
tor. Indeed, they are a ubiquitous feature of the legal landscape of
private entitlements. Real property is subject to adverse possession
and claims by good faith encroachers.'0 Copyrights expire, and owners
cannot block "fair uses" of protected material. ' Businesses can be
forced to allow competitors use of "essential facilities" under antitrust
98 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 101 Mich L Rev at 5 (cited in note 30) ("Pliability rules ...
are dynamic rules, while property and liability rules are static.").
99 Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv L Rev 509, 529-30
(1986).
100 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 101 Mich L Rev at 55 (cited in note 30) (laying out the
criteria for a successful adverse possession claim).
101 Id at 50-51 ("[T]he fair use privilege empowers courts to excuse unauthorized appropri-
ation of a copyrighted work when doing so advances the public benefit without substantially
impairing the economic value of the original work.").
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law.'O More broadly, as Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest have
noted, coercive transfers of entitlements are widely seen in private
law, and they share many of the animating principles of takings. 'O,
To be sure, there is one feature of the pliability rule created by
eminent domain that differs from the examples I have just given. Emi-
nent domain permits the taker to trigger the change in the pliability rule
that alters protection. This is not the case with antitrust law, where the
change is triggered by the behavior of the entitlement holder. Argua-
bly, it is not even the case with adverse possession, where an adverse
possessor must invest a considerable amount of time to change the
entitlement and, in some jurisdictions, must not intend to change the
ownership of the property.' In this sense, the pliability rule used in
takings approaches a standard liability rule, in which anyone may take
the entitlement at any time in exchange for a price established by an
outside actor.'05 Yet there is no reason to view this one feature as mak-
ing the effects of eminent domain fundamentally unlike all other plia-
bility rules. Certainly, for the owner of the entitlement, it makes little
difference that changed protection is triggered by the taker's choice,
rather than some other factor over which the entitlement holder has
just as little direct control. And the government, notwithstanding its
power of eminent domain, must nevertheless respect the property rule
protection of asset owners under ordinary circumstances. For instance,
government agents may not enter upon private property at will and
must instead either obtain the owner's permission or avail themselves
of a special privilege such as that granted by a court-issued warrant."
F. Public and Private Takings
We have seen, thus far, what the takings power is meant to accom-
plish, the difficulty of distinguishing it from other government powers,
and the shortcomings of the law of takings in limiting exercises of the
takings power to those cases where its use would be just and/or effi-
102 Id at 35-36.
103 See Bouckaert and De Geest, 15 Intl Rev L & Econ at 476-77 (cited in note 6).
104 See, for example, Wis Stat Ann § 893.25(2)(a) (West).
105 However, the entitlement should not be viewed as being protected only by a liability
rule as there are contexts in which it enjoys property rule protection against the government
actor that holds the power of eminent domain. In characterizing takings this way, I differ from
Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1089 (cited in note 27), as well as from Merrill, 72
Cornell L Rev at 61 (cited in note 3), who view the takings power as establishing a general re-
gime under which private property enjoys property rule protection against all but the govern-
ment, but liability rule protection only against the state.
106 See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2-3 at
290-330 (West 4th ed 2004) (describing searches executed at residential premises through con-
sent and search warrants).
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cient. To summarize: the takings power renders all private property sub-
ject to pliability rule protection vis-A-vis the government. The govern-
ment may take property at any time, subject only to the constitutional
requirements that it pay "just compensation" (market value compen-
sation) and that it designate the taken property for "public use" (near-
ly any use). By contrast, efficiency and justice would require that prop-
erty be subject to taking by the government only in those circumstances
where (1) the government is the superior owner, and (2) high transac-
tion costs or strategic barriers block consensual transfer of ownership to
the government.""
This brings us to the central question addressed by this Article: why
should the takings power be solely limited to the government? As we
have seen, a takings power, when combined with a just compensation
limitation, essentially makes all entitlements subject to pliability rule
protection vis-A-vis the government. Under this pliability rule, the taker
temporarily changes protection of the asset from property rule to liabil-
ity rule, pays compensation in accordance with the terms of the liability
rule, and then keeps the asset under the protection of a new property
rule. Yet, the government is not the only actor that can take advantage
of a pliability rule in order to obtain assets that would ordinarily be un-
der the property rule protection of another. As we saw, pliability rules,
such as the rules of fair use or essential facilities, may also allow private
actors to abridge the property rights of other individuals.
118
Why, then, should this particular form of pliability protection only
accrue to the benefit of the government? The question is particularly
pressing in light of the strategic failings presumed to be alleviated by
the law of takings. As Judge Richard Posner has noted, the strategic
problems addressed by the power of eminent domain-holdouts,
asymmetric information, and bilateral monopoly- are not unique to the
public sector.'9 Desirable private projects, just like public ones, may be
held up by holdouts. The typical land assembly project that demands
eminent domain for its success"° will often occur in the private sector,
rather than the public. Asymmetric information may block welfare-
enhancing private projects as well; large corporations involved in ga-
thering assets for a large commercial project may face as much difficul-
ty hiding their plans as the government. Indeed, if the corporation is
publicly held, securities laws may require revealing its plans, while the
107 But see Nosal, Private Takings at 17-19 (cited in note 6) (demonstrating that given bad
incentives for owner development, takings powers produce net welfare losses absent "signifi-
cant" holdout problems).
108 See Part I.E.
109 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 55 (cited in note 60).
110 For a discussion of the importance of eminent domain in land assembly, see id.
2009]
The University of Chicago Law Review
private owner from which the corporation hopes to obtain the property
labors under no such constraints. Moreover, large private development
projects often require zoning changes or variances, requiring early reve-
lation of plans. And, of course, bilateral monopoly may occur anywhere
in the private markets.
To be sure, there is a price to be paid for reducing the availability
of property rule protection to asset owners. Less ability to hold out
and to exclude means less stability value for ownership, and a possible
reduction of the value of the property relationship.'" Thus, any increase
in the vulnerability of assets to takings imposes a cost on all property
ownership. However, this does not seem to be a very good reason for
distinguishing between permissible and impermissible takings solely on
the basis of the proposed taker being private instead of public. Gov-
ernment takings may be made for trivial purposes that produce net
social loss, while potential private takings might lead to large social
welfare gains. It would seem better, therefore, to defend property sta-
bility not by privileging government takings, but rather, by restricting
takings altogether -irrespective of the taker-to those instances in
which the harm to property value is justified by the large benefit pro-
duced by the taking.
Nor can one justify privileging government takings on the grounds
of curbing possible takings abuse. Certainly, an unlimited private taking
power might be abused, but so too may a public taking power. Private
takings powers can be circumscribed to curb potential abuse. Moreover,
the reliance on public decisionmaking by a state apparatus, rather than
the discipline of the market, seems unlikely to reach efficient results. I
discuss this last issue in greater detail in Part III;'. for now, it suffices to
note that the justifications for a public taking power would seem logi-
cally to justify a private taking power as well.
II. PRIVATE TAKINGS, PAST AND PRESENT
In this Part, I move from the theoretical to the empirical and his-
torical. Specifically, I demonstrate the pervasiveness of private takings
mechanisms in American law. Although the notion seems somewhat
strange today, private takings have long been permitted by American
law. In this Part, I present some of the chief mechanisms used by the
federal and state governments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries to empower private takings. I also discuss modern legal practices
that functionally constitute private takings. Finally, I compare these me-
thods to another mechanism that bears great similarity to a private tak-
111 See generally Bell and Parchomovsky, 90 Cornell L Rev 531 (cited in note 53).
112 See Part III.
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ing: adverse possession. The aim of this Part is to demonstrate the
wide range of options available for implementing a regime of private
takings. As I argue in Part III, the mechanisms of earlier centuries do
not exhaust the range of private takings options. However, they
present many alternatives that are worth considering today.
A. Traditional Private Takings
1. Delegated private takings.
In the nineteenth century, every state in the union delegated the
power of eminent domain to turnpike, bridge, canal, and railroad com-
panies." These delegations essentially put the private actor-the com-
pany beneficiary of the delegation-in the place of the government
with regard to the law of eminent domain. Additionally, the nineteenth-
century Mill Acts authorized riparian owners to dam watercourses and
flood neighboring land in order to power mills. The mill owners would
confiscate the flooded land and pay compensation.14
Even during their nineteenth-century heyday, delegated private
takings were not universally popular, and a number of courts and legis-
latures sought to cut back on such powers. "' In Ryerson v Brown,"' for
instance, the Michigan Supreme Court restricted the exercise of emi-
nent domain by private corporations in cases where it found exercise of
the power unnecessary."7 Later, in 1888, the New York Court of Appeals
struck down Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Railway Company's takings
power because the court considered easing public access to Niagara
118Falls an insufficient public purpose. By the early twentieth century,
state law had cut back significantly on the eminent domain power, limit-
ing various doctrines that reduced compensation for owners deprived
of their property."'
113 See Scheiber, 33 J Econ Hist at 237 (cited in note 41).
114 See note 8. See also Epstein, Takings at 170-76 (cited in note 3).
115 See Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 Yale L & Policy Rev 1, 9-11 (2003) (describing state court actions
that restricted the exercise of eminent domain by private corporations); Scheiber, 33 J Econ Hist
at 240-42 (cited in note 41) (pointing to state constitutional reforms in the late nineteenth cen-
tury aimed at restricting the use of eminent domain including requirements that compensation
for takings be determined by a jury).
116 35 Mich 333 (1877).
117 Id at 339,341-42.
118 In re Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Railway Co, 15 NE 429, 432 (NY App 1888) ("[T]o
provide for the portion of the public who may visit Niagara falls better opportunities for seeing
the natural attractions ... is not a public purpose which justifies [a taking].").
119 See Scheiber, 33 J Econ Hist at 248-49 (cited in note 41) (noting that states began re-
quiring prior payment and jury trials for land expropriated by private corporations).
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Yet, many states continue to permit railroads and utilities to under-
take more limited private condemnations today. For instance, Alabama
permits the exercise of eminent domain by electric companies and op-
erators of water systems, sanitary sewer systems, and television satellite
systems under the same rules as public takings.'2 Among other states
recognizing private takings powers under similar circumstances are Ar-
kansas, ' Illinois,'2 2 Indiana," Kansas, Oklahoma, 12 and Texas. '
A handful of states have expanded the power of private takings to
other private actors, such as miners and loggers seeking to condemn
land for roads and railroads to transport goods,'25 or individuals seeking
to transport water for irrigation or other purposes.128
2. Private takings and necessity.
A different type of private taking that can still be found in state
law today is the right to take easements in neighboring real property
by reason of necessity. While only a minority of states allows these pri-
vate takings, they remain important and well-established means of pri-
vately taking property interests. The doctrines permitting such private
takings of easements go under a number of names, such as "private
ways of necessity.'129
To understand the unique nature of such private takings of ease-
ments, a brief explanation of ordinary easement law is necessary. Ease-
ments are property interests allowing the owner use rights in realty pos-
sessed by another. Typically, easements arise by express grant, where the
120 See, for example, Ala Code § 37-6-3(15) (Michie) (granting electric cooperatives the
power to exercise eminent domain).
121 See Arkansas Power & Light Co v Harper, 460 SW2d 75 (Ark 1970) (power transmission
line).
122 See Times Mirror Cable Television of Springfield v First National Bank, 582 NE2d 216
(I11 App 1991) (cable television wiring).
123 See Hagemeier v Indiana & Michigan Electric Co, 457 NE2d 590 (Ind App 1983) (elec-
tric transmission line right of way).
124 See Williams Telecommunications Co v Gragg, 750 P2d 398 (Kan 1988) (fiber optic cable
for telecommunications).
125 See Mclnturff v Oklahoma Natural Gas Transmission Co, 475 P2d 160 (Okla 1970) (gas
pipeline).
126 See Aquila Southwest Pipeline Corp v Gupton, 886 SW2d 497 (Tex App 1994) (gas pipeline).
127 See Or Rev Stat § 772.410 (2007) (allowing logging and mining companies to condemn
land up to sixty feet in width in order to "construct and operate railroads, skid roads, tramways,
chutes, pipelines and flumes").
128 See, for example, Colo Rev Stat Ann § 37-86-102 (West); Idaho Code Ann §§ 42-1102,42-1106
(West); Utah Code Ann § 73-1-6 (West). See also Bubb v Christensen, 610 P2d 1343, 1346 (Colo
1980) ("[T]he owner of a conditional water right may condemn rights-of-way over the lands of
others for the purpose of transporting water.").
129 See Colo Const Art II, § 14 ("Private property shall not be taken for private use unless
by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity."); Colo Rev Stat Ann § 38-1-102(3)
(West) ("[P]rivate property may be taken for private use, including private ways of necessity.").
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owner of the servient parcel grants an easement - generally, a right of
way-for the benefit of the dominant parcel.m Additionally, a number
of doctrines allow easements to arise by implication or by necessity.
For example, in most states, easements by strict necessity arise where a
parcel is divided into two parcels owned by different parties, and a
right of way across one of the parcels (now the servient estate) is ne-
cessary for ingress to and egress from the other parcel (now the domi-
nant estate). ' For the easement to arise, the necessity must have ex-
isted in the whole parcel at the time of separation, such that the ease-
ment may be viewed as having been created at separation. 2 Only the
combination of these circumstances automatically gives rise to an
easement that lasts so long as the necessity continues.
However, a minority of states allows claimants of an easement by
necessity to create a new use right by an act of seizure or condemna-
tion. In Colorado, for example, landowners may create private "ways of
necessity" on their neighbors' real property where the easements are
"indispensable to the practical use of the property for which they are
claimed. 33 Interestingly, owners may invoke the right to create private
ways of necessity as an alternative to easements by strict necessity. Thus,
the taking owner need not show a common origin of the two parcels in
order to create the private way. Instead, Colorado law requires con-
demners to show that they have a sufficient interest in the benefited
property to entitle them to condemnation and that there is a practical
necessity for the private way.1' These requirements clearly demonstrate
that the new easement relies on a theory of seizure rather than im-
plied grant. Similar statutes in other states sometimes go under the
name of "private road" laws." '
Both delegated private takings powers and private ways of necessi-
ty have come under criticism for violating constitutional "public use"
clauses. Generally, however, the courts have upheld the constitutionality
of private takings, finding that the private benefit to the taker provides
sufficient "public" benefit to justify the exercise of eminent domain.
130 An easement appurtenant is for the benefit of a property, while an easement in gross
accrues to the benefit of a person. See Herbert Hovenkamp and Sheldon F Kurtz, The Law of
Property:An Introductory Survey 319 (West 5th ed 2001).
131 See, for example, Morrell v Rice, 622 A2d 1156,1158 (Me 1993) ("An easement by neces-
sity, an easement implied in the law, may be created when a grantor conveys a lot of land from a
larger parcel and that conveyed lot is 'landlocked' by the grantor's surrounding land and cannot
be accessed from a road or highway.") (quotation marks and citations omitted).
132 See, for example, Othen v Rosier, 226 SW2d 622,625-26 (Tex 1950).
133 Crystal Park Co v Morton, 146 P 566,569 (Colo App 1915).
134 Robyn W. Kube, Access at Last: The Use of Private Condemnations, 29 Colo Lawyer 77,
78 (Feb 2000). For state-by-state requirements for private ways of necessity, see generally Jon W.
Bruce and James W. Ely, Jr, The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 4:6 (West 2008).
135 See, for example, Wyo Stat Ann § 24-9-101 (Michie).
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The public benefit has been found in greater tax revenues,13 moreproductive use of assets,'7 increased economic activity,' and the like.
B. Government-mediated Private Takings
Alongside the traditional private takings mechanisms identified in
the previous Part, there exists a species of public takings that should be
seen as effecting private takings. In this Part, I discuss one such type of
private takings under the label of government-mediated private takings.
In government-mediated private takings, private actors seize prop-
erty through eminent domain but rely upon the government's formal
authority to do so. These types of takings do not involve any delegation
of the power of eminent domain. Rather, the government exercises its
own taking power to seize property from one private actor, and then
grants it to another private actor. Such takings have also been designat-
ed "public-private takings."' 9
Eminent domain has been used in order to engage in resource al-
location among private parties for egalitarian and social engineering
purposes. Perhaps the most famous state exercise of this kind was
upheld in Midkiff. Hawaii had confiscated property of large landowners
to redistribute it to the erstwhile tenants.'4° Hawaii only seized property
when more than half of the tenants of that property expressed an inter-
est in purchasing it. The purchasing tenants would then pay the former
landlords directly for the seized property at a negotiated price or at a
price set by the condemning court.'' Like the Michigan Supreme Court
in Poletown, the US Supreme Court rejected the argument that the tak-
ing lacked a public purpose, finding that the act aimed at the public
purpose of reducing the perceived social and economic evils of a land
136 See, for example, Marinclin v Urling, 262 F Supp 733,736 (WD Pa 1967) (finding public
benefit in a road created through a taking by necessity because it will increase tax assessments
on a landlocked parcel), affirmed, 384 F2d 872 (3d Cir 1967).
137 See, for example, Dowling v Erickson, 644 SW2d 264, 266 (Ark 1983) (justifying con-
demnation for a private access road because doing so would transform a useless parcel into
productive property).
138 See, for example, Bieker v Suttons Bay Township Supervisor, 496 NW2d 398, 400 (Mich
App 1992) ("The economic activity resulting from the land's use benefits the community as a
whole and the increase in the land's value broadens the community's tax base.").
139 See generally Jeffery W Scott, Public Use and Private Profit: When Should Heightened
Scrutiny Be Applied to "Public-private" Takings?, 12 J Affordable Housing & Community Dev L
466 (2003). See also Kulick, 2000 Detroit Coil L at 642 n 8 (cited in note 11) ("[T]he term con-
notes a scenario where the government uses eminent domain to take land and directly transfers
it to a private entity under the guise of economic revitalization for the sake of fighting unemploy-
ment as a valid public use.").
140 Midkiff, 467 US at 229.
141 See id at 233-34.
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oligopoly in which seventy-two individuals owned more than 90 percent
of the privately owned land."2
Government-mediated private taking has proved more conten-
tious where invoked for fungible commercial purposes, as indicated by
the controversy surrounding Poletown. ' General Motors had decided
to close a money-losing plant in Detroit and relocate it to a cheaper
location. In order to forestall GM's location of the new plant out of
state, Detroit agreed to furnish, at low cost, a parcel of land for the
new facility. The City selected the land on which the Poletown neigh-
borhood was located, and it seized the homes by eminent domain. Po-
letown residents lost their political and legal battles against the con-
demnation, and the city eventually obtained all the desired land at a
cost of some $200 million. Detroit then transferred the land to GM for
$8 million. The residents' legal challenge to the city's action focused
on the use of the power of eminent domain in order to benefit a pri-
vate actor. The residents claimed that since GM was the intended be-
neficiary of the condemnation, no public use justified the exercise of
the government's eminent domain power.'" The Michigan Supreme
Court reasoned otherwise, finding a public purpose in "alleviating un-
employment and revitalizing the economic base of the community."1 '45
Poletown, however, is far from the only case in which the govern-
ment exercised its power of eminent domain in order to transfer prop-
erty from a private holder to a commercial actor. Eminent domain has
played a critical and controversial role in urban renewal schemes in-
volving the condemnation of private property and its transfer to a pri-
142 See id at 241-42,245.
143 For a review of the facts surrounding the Poletown case, see generally John J. Bukowczyk,
The Decline and Fall of a Detroit Neighborhood: Poletown vs G.M. and the City of Detroit, 41
Wash & Lee L Rev 49 (1984). See also Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor, The Sustaining
Han& Community Leadership and Corporate Power 143-62 (Kansas 2d ed 1993). For criticism of
the case, see Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletownr County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Devel-
opment Takings and the Future of Public Use, 2004 Mich St L Rev 1005, 1006-09 ("Poletown ...
stood as both the most visible symbol of eminent domain abuse and as a precedent justifying nearly
unlimited power to condemn private property."); William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of
Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004
Mich St L Rev 929, 929-30 (arguing that the Poletown takings would not have occurred without
federal earmarks for the project); James W. Ely, Jr, Can the "Despotic Power" Be Tamed? Reconsi-
dering the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, Probate & Prop 30,35 (Nov/Dec 2003) ("To
many observers of differing political viewpoints, the Poletown case was a poster child for excessive
condemnation."); Thomas S. Ulen, Still Hazy after All These Years, 22 L & Soc Inq 1011,1036 (1997)
("The Michigan Supreme Court's sanctioning of this taking is, I believe, an outrage.").
144 See Poletown, 304 NW2d at 458 (noting the plaintiffs' view that "assembling land ... for
conveyance to General Motors for its uncontrolled use in profit making is really a taking for
private use and not a public use").
145 Id at 459.
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vate developer.' In Berman, the US Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a Washington, DC plan to clear "slums" and "blighted
areas" by acquiring property, sometimes by eminent domain, and then
leasing or selling it to private developers, all in accordance with a "com-
prehensive plan.' '.7 As Wendell Pritchett has noted, Berman opened the
floodgates to extensive "public-private" development in which the gov-
ernment uses its eminent domain powers to organize parcels of realty
for private building plans."
Today, many states employ development corporations or authori-
ties to condemn property for private use in order to "improve the busi-
ness climate" or engage in "urban renewal.' ' .9 For instance, the State of
New York's Empire State Development Corporation recently approved
the condemnation of land in midtown Manhattan (on Sixth Avenue,
between 42nd and 43rd Streets) in order to turn it over to a private
developer for building a fifty-one-story office tower for Bank of
America." ° Other controversial recent takings have included the tak-
ing of church property in Cypress, California to make way for a Cost-
co store;1 the taking of used car dealerships in San Leandro, Califor-
nia and Merriam, Kansas in order to replace them with new car dea-
lerships;"" and various condemnations in order to provide parking and
tunnels for casinos.1
This practice is not without its critics. Chastened by public criti-
cism, the Supreme Court of Michigan asserted in Hathcock that it was
overruling the generous interpretation of public use endorsed in Pole-
town, and that it would henceforth only approve government-mediated
146 See Pritchett, 21 Yale L & Policy Rev at 1 (cited in note 115).
147 Id at 35-36.
148 See Pritchett, 21 Yale L & Policy Rev at 4 (cited in note 115).
149 See id at 39-40 (discussing states' uses of eminent domain to transfer property to private
developers, citing reconstruction and rehabilitation). Eminent domain is not the only govern-
mental power employed in such public-private ventures. Tax and other direct financial incentives
are probably the most popular tool. See generally Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Struc-
tures in Urban Governance, 82 Minn L Rev 503 (1997) (describing enterprise zones, tax incre-
ment financing districts, business improvement districts, and special zoning as tools employed by
local governments for municipal development).
150 See Michael McDonald, Durst Deal Done, The Bond Buyer 25 (Dec 29,2003) (detailing
a deal to assemble land for bank headquarters).
151 See Evan Halper, Cypress OKs Seizure of Church Land, LA Times B1 (May 29, 2002)
(describing a city council meeting attended by hundreds of church members protesting the tak-
ing of their land for a Costco store).
152 See Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain: A Five-year, State-by-state Report Ex-
amining the Abuse of Eminent Domain 36,79 (Castle Coalition 2004).
153 See Dana Berliner, Opening the Floodgates: Eminent Domain Abuse in the Post-Kelo




private takings upon fulfillment of one of three conditions.'" First, such
takings may be justified where necessary for extreme public necessity
(such as land assembly)." Second, takings for a private owner can be
endorsed where the private owner "remains accountable to the public
in its use of that property" such as where it would devote the use of the
property to a publicly regulated pipeline.' Third, where the targeted
property is of public concern, such as a slum, property may be seized
and turned over to a private owner. ' Using this test, the court over-
turned a county decision to seize private property by eminent domain
in order to convert it to a privately owned business and technology
park. State courts in Arkansas, ' Florida,' 5' Kentucky," Maine,' 6' New
Hampshire, '6' South Carolina, ' and Washington" have also struck down
government-mediated private takings for lack of public use. And while
the Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut ruling in favor of such a tak-
ing in Kelo, permitting the taking of homes in connection with a major
drug corporation's new global research facility in order to develop
neighboring parks, private homes and commercial uses,'0 the subse-
quent public outcry is leading to widespread restrictions on some kinds
of "economic development" takings.64
Yet, these exceptions do not disprove the rule. Many states have
allowed and continue to allow government-mediated private takings.
154 Hathcock, 684 NW2d at 796 (holding that assembling land for a private project that
would create jobs and raise tax revenues does not satisfy the public use requirement for the
exercise of eminent domain).
155 Id at 783.
156 Id at 782.
157 Id at 782-83.
158 See, for example, Little Rock v Raines, 411 SW2d 486, 493-94 (Ark 1967) (finding that
taking land for an industrial park did not constitute a public use).
159 See, for example, Baycol, Inc v Downtown Development Authority, 315 S2d 451,456-58
(Fla 1975) (holding eminent domain not justified to build a parking lot needed to support a
private development).
160 See, for example, Owensboro v McCormick, 581 SW2d 3,5-8 (Ky 1979) (noting that allow-
ing unconditional governmental power to compel citizens to surrender property because an "alter-
native private use is thought to be preferable ... is repugnant to our constitutional protections").
161 See, for example, Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court Given under the
Provisions of Section 3 of Article IV of the Constitution, 131 A2d 904, 907-08 (Me 1957) (holding
unconstitutional a state act that would allow government takings on behalf of private enterprises).
162 See, for example, Merrill v Manchester, 499 A2d 216, 217-18 (NH 1985) (finding that
condemnation of land for an industrial park would not be considered an acceptable public use
for eminent domain purposes because the private benefits outweigh the public benefits).
163 See, for example, Karesh v City Council, 247 SE2d 342, 344-45 (SC 1978) (deciding that
the condemnation of land for a convention center that would be operated by a private developer
does not constitute an acceptable public use).
164 See, for example, In re Seattle, 638 P2d 549, 556 (Wash 1981) ("A beneficial use is not
necessarily a public use.").
165 See 545 US at 477.
166 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 106 Colum L Rev at 1425-26 (cited in note 2).
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States may mediate private takings to solve narrower problems of ex-
cessive transaction costs in the use of resources. Consider first the issue
of compulsory pooling of natural resources. Traditionally, subsurface oil
and gas has been governed by the property rule of capture, '6, most fa-
miliar from the context of wild animals. '6 Under that rule, oil and gas
are owned by no one so long as they remain in the "state of nature."
They become subject to an owner's property rights only when she takes
possession of them and only for so long as she maintains possession.16
As might be expected, the rule of capture induces races to drill. Where a
single pool of oil lies under the land of multiple owners, each will at-
tempt to drill and withdraw as much of the oil as quickly as possible. So
long as the oil remains in the ground, it belongs to no one. Pooling
laws aim at averting this race to the bottom by aggregating the surface
owners above a pool of oil or gas into a joint venture for purposes of
drilling."" Voluntary pooling agreements require the consent of each
surface owner.' However, a number of states force property owners
into pooling arrangements, generally by order of an administrative
body.'" Under such arrangements, the administrative agency essential-
ly orders landowners to consent to pooling, or to sell the land above
the pool to neighbors. Thus, for instance, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that the administrative agency empowered to act under the
state's compulsory pooling statute could order a nonconsenting lan-
downer to participate or involuntarily sell his working interests to the
operator for a "fair price. '173
167 See, for example, Hammonds v Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co, 75 SW2d 204,206 (Ky
1934) (treating natural gas as a "migratory" resource subject to capture).
168 See Pierson v Post, 3 Cai R 175 (NY 1805), the seminal case awarding property rights in a fox
to the first possessor despite the historical practice that the pursuer was entitled to catch the fox.
169 See Hammonds, 75 SW2d at 205 ("[Oil and gas] belong to the owner of the land as a part
of it so long as they are on it or in it or subject to his control; when they are gone, his title is gone.").
170 See 38 Am Jur 2d Gas and Oil § 186 at 562 (1999) (noting that without such a joint ar-
rangement a single owner might be able to exploit the pool to the detriment of the other owners).
171 Id at § 187 at 563-64.
172 See, for example, Atlantic Richfield Co v Tomlinson, 859 P2d 1088, 1096 (Okla 1993) (de-
scribing forced pooling in the context of an ownership dispute over an oil, gas and mineral lease-
hold); V-FPetroleum, Inc vA.K. Guthrie Operating Co, 792 SW2d 508,511 (Tex App 1990). See also
Annotation, Validity of Compulsory Pooling or Unitization Statute or Ordinance Requiring Own-
ers or Lessees of Oil and Gas Lands to Develop Their Holdings As a Single Drilling Unit and the
Like, 37 ALR 2d 434 § 1 (1954):
A statute under which owners of small or irregularly shaped tracts can be required to de-
velop their lands as a single drilling unit for conservation purposes is usually defined as "a
compulsory pooling" statute. It is contrasted with a compulsory unitization statute, which
applies ordinarily to joint operations on a large scale, such as those covering an entire oil or
gas field. However, sometimes the terms are used interchangeably.
173 See Anderson v Corporation Commission, 327 P2d 699, 702-03 (Okla 1957) (upholding
the constitutionality of a forced pooling arrangement for oil drilling).
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C. Other Nonconsensual Private Acquisitions of Property
Private takings are not the only means of effectuating nonconsen-
sual transfers of property between private individuals."' The doctrine of
adverse possession permits trespassers to gain title to another's land by
wrongfully occupying it for an extended period of time.'75 The doctrine
of prescription permits a similar taking of use rights after lengthy
wrongful use."' To succeed on an adverse possession (or prescription)
claim, the occupier must show that her occupation is hostile to the own-
er's interest, actual, open and notorious, exclusive, and continuous for
the statutorily mandated period of time." The successful adverse pos-
sessor obtains the full set of rights associated with property owner-
ship.' Adverse possession, then, effectively permits private actors to
take others' property.
Before seeking to understand adverse possession, it is important to
bear in mind that adverse possession does not fall precisely into the
framework of private takings as discussed earlier. Private takings carried
out by eminent domain-whether by delegation, government mediation,
or other legal doctrine-permit the taker to convert the property own-
er's legal protection from a property rule to a liability rule by the volun-
tary act of invoking the power of eminent domain. Under most versions
174 My definition of private takings therefore differs from that employed by Bouckaert and
De Geest. See Bouckaert and De Geest, 15 Intl Rev L & Econ at 463 (cited in note 6) (defining
private takings as situations in which one private party does not consent to a transfer).
175 See William B. Stoebuck and Dale A. Whitman, The Law of Property 853 (West 3d ed
2000); Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 Harv L Rev 135, 135 (1918) ("[T]he
doctrine [of adverse possession] apparently affords an anomalous instance of maturing a wrong
into a right contrary to one of the most fundamental axioms of the law. 'For true it is, that neither
fraud nor might / Can make a title where there wanteth right."'), quoting Altham's Case, 77 Eng
Rep 707 (1611).
176 See Stoebuck and Whitman, The Law of Property at § 8.7 (cited in note 175) (discussing
the requirements of an easement by prescription and comparing such easements to adverse
possession).
177 See Howard v Kunto, 477 P2d 210,213 (Wash App 1970) (restating the oft-quoted rule that
"to constitute adverse possession, there must be actual possession which is uninterrupted, open and
notorious, hostile and exclusive, and under a claim of right made in good faith for the statutory
period") (emphasis omitted); Van Valkenburgh v Lutz, 106 NE2d 28,29 (NY 1952); Stoebuck and
Whitman, The Law of Property at § 8.7 (cited in note 175); John P. Dwyer and Peter S. Menell,
Property Law and Policy: A Comparative Institutional Perspective 77-82 (Foundation 1998) (ex-
plaining the common law requirements). But see Chaplin v Sanders, 676 P2d 431,436 (Wash 1984)
(overruling Howard v Kunto to the extent that the case suggested a good-faith requirement for
adverse possession, and specifically noting that an adverse possessor's "subjective belief regarding
his true interest in the land and his intent to dispossess or not dispossess another is irrelevant");
O'Keefe v Snyder, 416 A2d 862, 870, 872 (NJ 1980) (noting that in the case of works of art, the "in-
troduction of equitable considerations through the discovery rule [providing that a cause of action
will not accrue until the injured party discovered or should have discovered facts supporting a cause
of action] provides a more satisfactory response than the doctrine of adverse possession").
178 See Stoebuck and Whitman, The Law of Property § 11.7 at 853 (cited in note 175) ("Title
gained [through adverse possession] is usually in fee simple absolute.").
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of adverse possession, by contrast, the adverse possessor must (or may)
believe that she is not taking possession of another's property in order
to be eligible for taking title."9 The doctrine of adverse possession,
therefore, is generally a means of dealing after the fact with a mistake.
Various explanations have been proffered for the doctrine of ad-
verse possession.O First, evidence of ownership decays over time, creat-
ing the need, some say, for limiting the time period in which an ejectment
suit may be brought.'81 Adverse possession rules, accordingly, clarify the
provenance of titles and facilitate transactions. Second, adverse posses-
sion is thought to incentivize owners to utilize their property efficiently.'83
Third and finally, adverse possession protects investments made by
squatters in reliance upon the strength of their possessory claim.'
None of these explanations fits within the framework of reasons to
provide for a private takings power described earlier. Traditional expla-
nations for eminent domain have focused either on the nature of sove-
reign powers or on expected strategic bargaining failures that lead to
the need for a coercive transfer mechanism to be initiated by the pur-
chaser. Evidentiary problems certainly do not fit within either expla-
nation, and, indeed, are easily resolved by improved recording sys-
tems. Adverse possession as a mechanism for improving property uti-
lization has also been widely criticized."' Opponents have noted that
179 See generally Richard H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 Wash
U L Q 331 (1983).
180 See generally Thomas J. Miceli and C.E Sirmans, An Economic Theory of Adverse Pos-
session, 15 Intl Rev L & Econ 161 (1995); Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules Liability Rules, and
Adverse Possession, 79 Nw U L Rev 1122 (1984).
181 Some claim that the role of adverse possession in eliminating unenforced property
claims and quieting title should be viewed as a separate and unique reason for the doctrine. See,
for example, Miceli and Sirmans, 15 Intl Rev L & Econ at 161 (cited in note 180) ("[B]y eliminat-
ing old claims to property, transaction costs are reduced, thereby facilitating market exchange.");
Merrill, 79 Nw U L Rev at 1129 (cited in note 180) (noting that without adverse possession old
claims to property could hinder its marketability).
182 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 101 Mich L Rev at 57 (cited in note 26) ("[Clear titles have
two desirable effects: they facilitate trade and reduce conflicts.").
183 See Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics of Possession, 86
Va L Rev 535,559 (2000):
The economic rationale of adverse possession, conceived as a method of shifting ownership
without benefit of negotiation or a paper transfer, can be made perspicuous by asking when
property should be deemed abandoned, that is, returned to the common pool of unowned
resources and so made available for appropriation through seizure by someone else. The
economist's answer is that this should happen when it's likely to promote the efficient use
of valuable resources.
184 See Eduardo Mois6s Pefialver and Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U Pa L Rev
1095,1170-71 (2007).
185 See, for example, Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89
Georgetown L J 2419, 2435 (2001) ("[Tjhere is little justification today for legal rules that force
the use of land ... the law has recognized that productive use can be undesirable.").
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the ideal use of property at any given time may be to leave it idle, due
to environmental or other conservation purposes, or simply because
the time for more intensive use has not yet arrived.'
As Thomas Miceli and C.E Sirmans have argued, the protection
of squatters' reliance interests appears to provide a stronger rationale
for the doctrine of adverse possession, but only as a way of dealing
with mistaken squatting on another's land." In such cases, say Miceli
and Sirmans, adverse possession rules prevent the title owner from ex-
torting quasi-rents from the possessor's expenditures in reliance upon
an initial error, while the lengthy time period before possession ripens
into title retains an incentive for squatters to investigate title before
building. ' By contrast, where the squatting is intentional, or where the
title owner has taken no steps to encourage the squatter's improve-
ments, there seems no reason to provide legal doctrines to protect the
squatter. Indeed, in such cases, ordinary property rules would seem to
properly align the incentives of all parties, while liability rules would
be both unfair and inefficient."9
While Miceli and Sirmans's theory does not match the traditional
description of the doctrine, it does accord with the way the doctrine is
practiced in the United States, as demonstrated by Richard Helmholz's
study showing that courts typically refuse to credit claims of adverse
possession of possessors shown to have acted in bad faith." This view of
adverse possession connects the rule with other doctrines designed to
protect good faith improvers of another's land. Generally, where courts
are convinced of the good faith of encroachers, they will refuse auto-
matic application of the common law rule of ejecting trespassers. In-
stead, courts will "balance the hardships" of the parties, and craft a
remedy that works the least loss on the title owner and the trespassing
improver." ' Such remedies may include the payment of damages, or
even a forced sale.'9 According to Miceli and Sirmans, the doctrine of
adverse possession should be understood as a way of dealing with the
186 See, for example, id at 2436 ("Leaving land idle may serve the beneficial purpose of
holding it until the best use becomes clear.").
187 Miceli and Sirmans, 15 Intl Rev L & Econ at 161-62 (cited in note 180).
188 Id.
189 Id at 165.
190 Id at 162; Helmholz, 61 Wash U L Q at 337 (cited in note 179) ("[Despite the absence
of any necessity, it is remarkable how frequently judges cite the existence and the relevance of
good faith.").
191 See, for example, Golden Press v Rylands, 235 P2d 592,595 (Colo 1951) ("Where defen-
dant's encroachment is unintentional and slight, plaintiffs use not affected and his damage small
and fairly compensable, while the cost of removal is so great as to cause grave hardship ... man-
datory injunction may properly be denied.").
192 See generally Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 NC L Rev 37
(1985) (examining the history of statutory and judicial relief granted to mistaken improvers).
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central shortcoming of doctrines of mistaken improvers: it is extraor-
dinarily difficult to determine ex post whether an encroachment re-
sulted from an honest mistake or from a deliberate trespass.i9
So understood, adverse possession is not quite a private takings
power. It is, rather, a doctrine designed to deal ex post with problems
of sequential wrongs. Thus it falls into a category of coerced transac-
tions attempting to deal with problems of time constraints, incapacity,
194
or error.
However, this does not mean that adverse possession could not be
refashioned into a private takings doctrine. Recently, Lee Anne Fennell
proposed reinterpreting the requirements of adverse possession in or-
der to make it function like a private takings power. '95 Fennell rejects
the view that adverse possession should be viewed as an ex post remedy
for mistaken improvement of another's land, and instead she argues
that the doctrine of adverse possession provides a way for claimants to
take possession of another's property deliberately." Specifically, she
claims that adverse possession should aim at "moving land into the
hands of a (much) higher-valuing user, where ordinary markets cannot
accomplish that task" -in other words, that it should strive to be a pri-
vate taking mechanism.' Indeed, to ensure that adverse possession be
used consciously, and with ex ante planning, as a private takings me-
chanism, Fennell urges that adverse possession claimants be required
to prove bad faith, that is, knowledge of wrongful entry contempora-
neous with the entry." Fennell argues that this would ensure that the
rule of adverse possession protects only efficient trespassers.9
Fennell's suggested version of adverse possession does not track
current law in most jurisdictions, and it is therefore difficult to suggest
that adverse possession is currently a private takings rule outside the
handful of states requiring a showing of bad faith."' However, Fen-
193 See Miceli and Sirmans, 15 Intl Rev L & Econ at 162 (cited in note 180).
194 Bouckaert and De Geest see all these phenomena, as well as bilateral monopolies, as
falling in the same category. See Bouckaert and De Geest, 15 Intl Rev L & Econ at 467-68 (cited
in note 6).
195 Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for "Bad Faith" Adverse Possession, 100
Nw U L Rev 1037, 1038 (2006) ("Instead of triggering moral condemnation and legal disadvan-
tage, a claimant's knowledge of the encroachment should be a prerequisite for obtaining title
under a properly formulated doctrine of adverse possession.").
196 Id at 1084-86.
197 Id at 1059--60.
198 Id at 1073-76 (positing that a knowing trespasser rule for adverse possessors will encour-
age highly efficient trespass because it provides a way for the law to "test the relative subjective
valuations of the parties").
199 Fennell, 100 Nw U L Rev 1073-76 (cited in note 195).
200 See id at 1039 n 10 (noting the "shrinking minority" of jurisdictions that continue to
adhere to a rule disqualifying those who make good faith mistakes in boundary dispute cases).
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nell's proposal reveals continuing recognition in some quarters of the
need for a private takings doctrine that would permit transfer of title
in the absence of a genuine ability to engage in market transfers.
Interestingly, adverse possession requires an unusual payment struc-
ture for the private taking. The original owner receives no compensa-
tion for her property at all, while the possessor need pay only by invest-
ing timeim' A would-be acquirer of property under eminent domain
must stake a possessory claim and then wait for the many years of the
statutory period until the possessory claim ripens into title to the prop-
erty. In the meantime, the possessor has no property rights and may be
ejected at the owner's will. At the end of the period, the possessor's title
relates back to the beginning, and the owner loses all rights, including
the right to compensation. = Thus, even if interpreted as a private tak-
ings doctrine, adverse possession diverges from the normal course of
takings: the acquirer must wait an extended period before being
awarded title, and the owner of the taken property enjoys no compensa-
tion. This makes adverse possession an awkward mechanism for non-
market transfers of property to higher-value users.203
III. REVIVING PRIVATE TAKINGS
In previous parts, I demonstrated the theoretical basis for private
takings and the existence of private takings doctrines throughout the
law. In this Part, I build on the descriptions of the theory of public tak-
ings and the current practice of private takings to offer a normative
analysis of private takings. Specifically, I suggest an approach to private
takings that integrates current theoretical and legal approaches to emi-
nent domain with the needs of private transfers of property through
takings. Based on existing models of public takings, I sketch out the
ideal domain of private takings. I then suggest methods for comparing
private and public takings and examine a number of possible mechan-
isms for implementing private takings in the law. The central theme of
this Part is that private takings may prove an appropriate means for
201 On a closely related subject, see Warsaw v Chicago Metallic Ceilings, 676 P2d 584, 590 (Cal
1984) (holding that takings of easements by prescription need not be accompanied by compensation).
202 See Jeffrey Evans Stake, 89 Georgetown L J at 2439-40, 2452 (cited in note 185) (ex-
plaining that as a consequence of the title relating back to the beginning of the adverse posses-
sion period, the successful adverse possessor cannot be liable for trespass).
203 Consider JA. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom, App No 44302/02 (Eur Ct HR 2005)
(holding that in some cases, uncompensated takings by adverse possession may violate property
rights protected under European Convention on Human Rights); Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC
v Rhode Island, 217 F Supp 2d 206,225-26 (D RI 2002), affirmed on other grounds, 337 F3d 87 (1st
Cir 2003) (asserting in obiter dictum that uncompensated takings by adverse possession may violate
the Fifth Amendment).
2009]
The University of Chicago Law Review
transferring property entitlements in a variety of circumstances without
significantly altering the overall scope or purpose of eminent domain.
A. When Private Takings
As seen in the previous Part, private takings are permitted -directly
or indirectly-in a number of areas of current law. Presumably, the law
provides for such takings on the basis of a dual belief that societal goals
are more efficiently served by transferring the property from one owner
to another and that such transfer will not be effected by ordinary mar-
ket transfer mechanisms. Yet, the various cases in which the law pro-
vides for a direct private takings mechanism lack any unifying theme
and seem, more than anything else, to reflect historical accident. Gov-
ernment-mediated private takings are explicitly ad hoc.
Notwithstanding this record, it is not difficult to state the circums-
tances in which a private takings power ought to be recognized. A pri-
vate taking power should be granted in those cases in the private mar-
ket parallel to those where the exercise of a governmental taking power
is warranted. Specifically, a private taking power should be granted
where the dual conditions of an appropriate taking are met: (1) the tak-
er is the preferred owner of the property right (for reasons of justice or
efficiency); and (2) strategic difficulties block the efficient or just trans-
fer of property rights in the market place. Grants of private taking pow-
er may be localized (to one or several grantees) or generalized (to a
large class of grantees). Whatever the number of grantees, the power
may be granted in advance to a class of transactions, or it may be
granted on a case-by-case basis with respect to specific transactions2
There are three keys to determining when and to whom to grant
the private taking power. The first is the likelihood of strategic barriers
blocking efficient transfers. Only when such barriers are substantial and
highly likely to occur should the law permit undermining the certainty
of property rights and transition from the ordinary property system to
the pliability system created by the private taking power. This reflects
the general preference for clearly defined property rights in order to
increase certainty and alienability and reduce transaction costs.M Rela-
tedly, the law must clearly define the circumstances in which such tak-
ings will be permitted. Without such clarity, private takings may fall
prey to the hazards of undue undermining of property and abuse of
the takings power in place of market transfer mechanisms. Alterna-
204 For a more limited suggestion of recognizing private eminent domain as an alternative to
dishonesty where nondisclosure is optimal, see Levmore, 68 Va L Rev at 142-44 (cited in note 3).
205 On the importance of stability in property rights and their protection through property
rules, see Bell and Parchomovsky, 90 Cornell L Rev 531,552-53 (cited in note 53).
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tively, the private takings power may be so restrictive as to continue to
prevent the transactions it seeks to promote.
Second, there must be some reliable mechanism for determining
that the taking effectuates a transfer to a desirable owner. The most
basic requirement for assuring this is the payment of the appropriate
amount of compensation. If compensation is set at the subjective value
of the property to the current owner, the proposed taker will only take
the property where she attaches a greater value to it than the current
owner. There are several important elements to ensuring that only de-
sired transfers take place. Private takings must be restricted to cases
where circumstances provide a reasonable means for adjudicating
property values. Where such values cannot be determined cost-
effectively, the takings power can no longer provide a solution for stra-
tegic bargaining problems. Moreover, without any guidance about such
value, it is impossible to ascertain whether property is in fact being
steered to the right owner. Additionally, payment for the taking must be
made by the actual private taker, rather than an intermediary such as
the government.2 This ensures that the taker indeed values the proper-
ty right more highly than the previous owner.
Third, the pliability rule created by the private taking power
should be superior to alternative pliability rules, or government media-
tion, under the circumstances. Consider, for instance, the essential facili-
ties doctrine in the law of antitrust. Essential facilities are facilities that
cannot practically be duplicated and are necessary for competitors' sur-
vival, such as a municipal sports stadium.f Because access to the facility
is considered essential, while the market for use of the facility is likely
to develop the inefficient dynamics of a monopoly, the essential facili-
ties doctrine dictates a transition to a liability rule: competitors may
make use of the facility without the owner's consent, in exchange for a
fair price, as set by the court or an administrator." This pliability rule is
superior to a private takings regime because continuing property rule
protection would leave the inefficiency in place irrespective of the own-
er. In the hands of a new posttaking owner, the facility would still be
essential, engendering the same monopoly inefficiencies. By contrast,
when a railroad seeks a pliability rule solution for the holdout problems
it encounters in trying to purchase land along the lay of the track, a
206 See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 Yale L J 547,584 (2001).
207 See, for example, Hecht v Pro-Football, Inc, 570 F2d 982,992 (DC Cir 1977) ("The essen-
tial facilities doctrine ... states that where facilities cannot practicably by duplicated by would-be
competitors, those in possession of them must allow them to be shared on fair terms").
208 See Brett Frischmann and Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75
Antitrust L J 1, 4 (2008) ("[Olpen access to infrastructural resources supports society's economic
interest in wealth maximization and allocative efficiency.").
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private taking power is the more appropriate solution. The private
taking allows a one-time transfer to the desired owner but returns to
an ordinary property regime thereafter.
In particular, it is worth remembering that a private taking is
worthwhile only when the desired endpoint remains private property
ownership in different hands. By the same token, implementation of the
private takings rule must not be so costly as to exceed the savings pro-
duced by overcoming strategic barriers to the transaction. Here, it is
important to recall the traditional discussion of the relative costs and
benefits of property and liability rule protection for entitlements."' As
noted earlier, the takings power essentially reduces an owner's legal
rights over an entitlement to pliability rule protection, comprised of
three stages. In the first stage, the owner enjoys property rule protection
over her asset and may accept or reject any offers to transact. In the
second stage, the taker may initiate a temporary change from property
rule to liability rule, allowing him to seize the object in exchange for
"just compensation." In the third and final stage, the taker holds the
entitlement and is himself entitled to property rule protection. The
temporary shift to liability rule protection allows a transfer with a
minimum of contracting costs but potentially weighty litigation costs.
For a private takings power to be worthwhile, the litigation costs pro-
duced by authorizing the taking and determining compensation must
not exceed the savings in contracting costs.
B. Models of Private Takings
In this Part, I propose for adoption a number of different private
takings mechanisms that meet the general outline presented in the
previous Part. The list draws heavily upon mechanisms already in use,
as described in Part II, and it makes no claim of being exhaustive. The
purpose is solely illustrative-to demonstrate how private takings rules
may serve as a superior means of transferring property rights between
private actors under certain circumstances. I examine three different
categories of private takings schemes. In the first, certain private ac-
tors are granted the ability to exercise a power of eminent domain
similar to that of the government. Here, actors enjoy generalized pow-
ers to take. The second category involves private takings powers that
are recognized among parties that find themselves in certain designat-
ed relationships with one another, such as neighbors. The focus here
moves from the taker to the original owner. The third and final group
209 See Part I.E.
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concerns private takings powers granted in relation to certain classes
of transactions, without reference to the particular parties involved.
1. Designated private takers.
Delegated private takings, as noted above, involve the direct em-
powering of private actors to invoke a traditional power of eminent
domain. Generally, utility companies are the beneficiaries of such del-
egations today; in previous eras, public carriers such as railroads also
generally received such powers.
It is not difficult to understand the rationale behind such broad
delegation of eminent domain powers. The empowered private takers
are viewed as sharing the characteristics of the government in ordi-
nary public takings-like the government, the private actors serve a
"public function" and will therefore likely be unable to control informa-
tion about their property acquisitions, as well as be subject to holdout
problems. However, such generous empowerments of private actors
possess considerable potential for overbreadth. Not every acquisition
of property by a utility involves strategic barriers that bar voluntary
transactions, and not every acquisition of property by a utility or pub-
lic carrier moves such property to its most efficacious owner. The re-
sult is that designating takers may authorize private takings even where
voluntary transactions would suffice.
One may summarize as follows the advantages and disadvantages
of designating certain private actors as always being able to engage in
private takings. On the one hand, such designations significantly reduce
the costs of litigation and investigation into the question of whether a
given private actor should be authorized to use a private takings power
in a particular case or for a particular object. On the other hand, such
designations may allow inefficient private takings, thereby leading to
two kinds of social loss-unduly weakened property stability and under-
compensation due to transactions at market price rather than the origi-
nal owner's true reserve price. Thus, the question of whether to issue a
generalized power to carry out private takings to a private actor boils
down to a comparison of two types of costs: (1) the errors and transac-
tion costs produced by a case-by-case analysis of the efficacy of a pri-
vate taking, and (2) the costs in lost property value and development in-
duced by greater indiscriminate availability of a private takings power.
Given this tradeoff, it makes sense to issue a broad authorization
to engage in private takings only where there is likely a real need for
private takings (on the grounds of strategic barriers to anticipated effi-
210 See notes 7 and 111 and accompanying text.
2009]
The University of Chicago Law Review
cient transactions), and it would be unnecessarily burdensome to re-
quire external ratification of each exercise of the takings power. Utili-
ty companies will generally be good candidates for general designation
as private takers. As regulated monopolies, they often lack the ability to
maintain privacy of information regarding intended property transac-
tions. As a consequence of their inability to disguise their intentions,
they may be subject to holdouts and other strategic difficulties in prop-
erty acquisition. Naturally, this argument only obtains for that class of
assets whose acquisition would be subject to such strategic problems.
This means that designated private takers should be able to exercise
their private takings power only for acquisition of land, in order to faci-
litate the assembly of large parcels or connected easements.
Additionally, in order to calibrate a policy of designated private
takers to meet the central needs of a takings rule, close attention must
be paid to the issue of compensation. As noted previously, takings rules
should assure both that the taker is a higher-value user and that the
taking is the more efficient means of carrying out the property trans-
fer. " If compensation is paid at a level that reflects the true reserve
price of the original property owner, and must be paid by the private
taker, the taker will refrain from seizing the property unless her own
valuation of it exceeds the current owner's reserve price. Consequent-
ly, by definition, the taker will seize property only when she is a higher-
value owner.
Unfortunately, the current owner's reserve price is not easily dis-
covered. The fact that the owner turns down market offers of a certain
price does not necessarily mean that the offer is lower than the re-
serve price. The owner may simply be strategically rejecting an offer
she feels is less than the ultimate price she may receive. Declarations
of the reserve price in a compensation hearing, too, are not good indi-
cators, as they are likely to be exaggerated. In such a hearing, there is
no reason for the owner to refrain from over-reporting the value, so
long as the overstatement is within the bounds of credibility.2' The
difficulty in ascertaining the correct reserve price undermines the de-
sirability of private takings on two grounds. First, as required compen-
sation diverges from the owner's reserve price, the likelihood of the
property ending up in the hands of its highest-value owner diminishes.
Excessive compensation deters too many takings by high-value own-
ers; insufficient compensation permits too many takings by low-value
owners. Second, would-be acquirers of property may overuse the pri-
211 See Part II.A.1.
212 See generally Jack L. Knetsch and Thomas E. Borcherding, Expropriation of Private
Property and the Basis for Compensation, 29 U Toronto L J 237 (1979) (questioning the use of
market value as compensation for expropriated property).
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vate takings power since the costs of proving the reserve value will fall
primarily on the original owner. Thus, there may be cases where takings
are used to acquire property even though litigation costs of takings ex-
ceed voluntary transactional costs for the simple reason that the taker
will bear much less of the former than the latter."'
One traditional way to deal with this problem is to require that
takers pay a fixed percentage in excess of fair market value. Nine-
teenth-century Mill Acts, for example, required the payment of a sub-
stantial bounty on market price in order to deter overuse; a New
Hampshire act considered by the Supreme Court in Head v Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company"' set compensation for private takings of ripa-
rian land at 150 percent of market value.' While the amount of such
bounties is necessarily arbitrary and an imprecise measure of aggre-
gate undercompensation, the bounties may serve to deter excessive
use of private takings. Importantly, there is no reason to suspect that
the problem of excessive takings in this regard differs in any way from
216that associated with ordinary public takings.
2. Designated asset or relationship private takings.
The power to execute private takings may also be recognized for
a designated asset, or set of relationships concerning an asset. For ex-
ample, private takings powers may be recognized in the hands of par-
ties seeking exclusive use of a domain name or other trademark. Simi-
larly, such powers may be granted to neighbors regarding realty. Here,
the focus is on the characteristic strategic problems accompanying
transactions regarding certain assets or within certain relationships,
rather than those typically faced by given types of private actors.
a) Domain names. I consider first the special relationships created
with respect to unique World Wide Web domain names. Cybersquatting
refers to the phenomenon of preemptive registration of popular Inter-
net domain names-often of trademarked names-with the purpose of
transferring the name at a profit to a third party (the owner of the
213 See Munch, 84 J Polit Econ at 495 (cited in note 94) (noting that in eminent domain pro-
ceedings the "structure of court costs [ ] induces higher buyer expenditure relative to the seller's on
low-valued properties, but the opposite relation on high-valued properties"). See also generally Bell
and Parchomovsky, 59 Stan L Rev 871 (cited in note 65) (setting out a self-assessment scheme as a
way of determining an accurate subjective value in eminent domain proceedings).
214 113 US 9 (1885).
215 Id at 10-11,26.
216 An alternative possibility might be through self-assessment mechanisms. See Bell and
Parchomovsky, 59 Stan L Rev at 891-95 (cited in note 65). Self-assessment mechanisms require a
penalty mechanism to ensure accurate reporting; the mechanisms we suggested for public tak-
ings would certainly need adjustment for private takings.
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trademark or the business associated with the name to be registered). 7
The first mover profits by virtue of her arbitrage, or, as courts might put
it, blackmail"' or ransom."' The domain name, even where not a recog-
nized trademark, is valuable because it is associated with a particular
product or potential owner (consider, for example, www.vw.net, most
valuable to Volkswagen=°). The first mover, taking advantage of the
small filing fee, profits by extracting value from the ideal owner. As
with other cases of "diluting" trademarks, the arbitrage is unnecessary
and results in inefficiency by raising transaction costs. Moreover,
since the sole purpose of the first move is to extract the more efficient
owner's gains, strategic difficulties are sure to plague the negotiations.
Congress has responded by permitting suit, compensation, and pu-
nishment for inappropriate registrations in bad faith.
States of mind like bad intent, unfortunately, are notoriously dif-
ficult to determine. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Actm
seeks to ease the evidentiary burden by listing nine factors to be consi-
dered by the court in determining intent, including such relatively easy
items as the personal and legal affiliation of the registrant to the name
and such vague ones as the registrant's intent to subvert the business of
the trademark owner."
As Gideon Parchomovsky noted, albeit under different terminolo-
gy, private takings provide a far more promising and comprehensive
solution to allocating the resource of domain names.224 Where domain
name contestants can take desired names from other owners for fair
compensation, the domain names will arrive in the hands of the owner
who most highly values them, without the strategic pitfalls incurred by
protecting the rights of registrants with property rule protection. Ob-
viously, for this mechanism to work, compensation would have to be set
at the subjective value to the name owner. Otherwise, the domain names
217 See Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace,
55 Vand L Rev 309,317-19 (2002).
218 See Virtual Works Inc v Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc, 238 F3d 264,269,271 (4th Cir 2001).
219 See American Girl, LLC v Nameview, Inc, 381 F Supp 2d 876,878 n 1 (ED Wis 2005).
220 See Virtual Works, 238 F3d at 270 ("[I]t is obvious even to the casual observer that the
similarity between vw.net and the VW mark is overwhelming.").
221 See Danielle Weinberg Swartz, The Limitations of Trademark Law in Addressing Domain
Name Disputes, 45 UCLA L Rev 1487, 1519 (1998) (advocating for a new federal cause of action
that would allow trademark holders to gain ownership of domain names based on their trademarks).
222 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 106-113, 113 Stat 1536 (1999),
codified at 15 USC § 1125(d) (creating a civil action for the bad faith intent to profit from the regis-
tration of a domain name that is "identical or confusingly similar" to a protected trademark).
223 Id.




would be subject to endless takings and retakings.n Parchomovsky thus
urged that contestants for a domain name be permitted to initiate an
auction for ownership of the name. In his analysis, the auction would
assure the name's allocation to the contestant who values it most highly,
without the high transaction costs associated with the statutory proce-
dure." 6 Importantly, the auction mechanism would provide a means of
revealing subjective valuation in order to anchor appropriate payment.
The case for special relationship private takings may be stated
more broadly and applied in other cases besides that of domain names.
Where there is a high likelihood of a certain party enjoying unusually
high benefits from an asset-that is, where there is an obvious "ideal
owner"-a private takings mechanism can potentially provide a lower
transaction-cost means of transferring the object to that ideal owner.
b) Neighbors. Neighbors in land provide another good example.
Consider, for instance, Jack and Jill, who own neighboring lots in a resi-
dential neighborhood. Jack wishes to move and sell his house and lot.
Jill, whose family is growing, will derive unusually high benefit from
Jack's lot, since she will be able to attach it to her own. However, since
Jack knows this, strategic difficulties may block the transfer, and Jack
may end up selling the property to another bidder on the open market.
The problem can be resolved with a private taking right for neighbors
when neighboring properties are offered for sale on the general market.
As Stewart Sterk has noted, neighbors in realty will have a par-
ticularly difficult time bargaining to solutions given the likelihood of
strategic failure stemming from bilateral monopoly.m Thus, neighbor
relations provide particularly fertile ground for private takings and oth-
er pliability rules. Private takings-in the form of preemptive purchase
rights, or through such existing doctrines as private takings of ease-
ments (or private ways of necessity) - can thereby be added to the
menu of departures from classic property rule protection (such as ad-
verse possessionn and good faith improver doctrines'") that can be used
to overcome the strategic bargaining difficulties between neighbors.
c) Partners in anticommons. Anticommons present another case in
which private takings are warranted. Anticommons exist where proper-
ty rights are overly fragmented -either because an asset has been sub-
225 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules:An Economic
Analysis, 109 Harv L Rev 713,765-66 (1996).
226 Cybersquatting may also be addressed through the rules of Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the international organization responsible for allocating
domain names.
227 See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors inAmerican Land Law, 87 Colum L Rev 55 (1987).
228 See Part II.C. See also Bell and Parchomovsky, 101 Mich L Rev at 55-59 (cited in note 30).
229 See Part II.C.
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divided into too many pieces or because ownership of a single asset has
been divided among too many owners."° This may happen, for example,
where ownership in a single piece of land is passed by inheritance for
several generations, to the point where owners own such small shares
that it no longer is cost-effective for any given owner to participate in
making decisions about the asset. Consider, for example, the Indian
Land Consolidation Act of 1983, ' struck down in Hodel v Irvingm by
the Supreme Court as an uncompensated taking. 3 The Act escheated to
the tribes extremely small fractional interests -defined as interests of
2 percent or less of the acreage of the whole and worth less than $100
per year in rental value -in Native American reservation lands in order
to prevent them from remaining in disuse."' One extremely fractionated
forty-acre tract covered by the law, worth $8,000, was owned by 439
owners, some with shares worth as little as $0.000418."
Allowing owners of such fractionated interests to seize one anoth-
er's claims in exchange for just compensation provides a cleaner way
of reducing transaction costs and reaggregating ownership. In instances
like this, the private taker might be permitted to deposit compensation
for all sufficiently small outstanding shares in a single account, leaving
it to each shareholder to prove her share and withdraw the relevant
compensation.
It goes without saying that in all of these cases of private takings by
designated asset or relationship, it is vital to require full compensation
in order to incentivize properly the would-be private taker.
3. Private takings and designated transactions.
Finally, the power to engage in private takings depends on the class
of transaction. This offers perhaps the greatest possibility for proper
limitation of the power to those cases where strategic bargaining diffi-
culties prevent welfare-enhancing transactions. However, if these trans-
230 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 Harv L Rev 621,623 (1998) (asserting that empty storefronts in Moscow are
an example of anticommons property created as a result of an initial endowment of disaggregated
rights); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics Economics and the Law of Property, in Pennock and Chapman,
eds, Nomos XXIV: Ethics, Economics, and the Law 3, 6, 9 (NYU 1982). See also Lee Anne Fen-
nell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw U L Rev 907, 926 (2004) ("In the prototypical anticom-
mons, everyone has the power to exclude everyone else from a resource, but nobody has the power
to enter or use that resource without the permission of everyone else.").
231 Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub L No 97-459, 96 Stat 2517, codified at 25
USC § 2201 et seq.
232 481 US 704 (1987).
233 Id at 717.
234 Id at 709.
235 Id at 713. It is worth noting that the extreme fragmentation was itself the result of feder-
al law that prohibited partition.
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actions are not to be identified on an ad hoc basis, the law will have to
tolerate some estimation regarding the types of transactions that are
likely to be afflicted by such problems. Here, the two best examples are
provided by land assembly and land use controls.
a) Land assembly. Land assembly is traditionally seen as the pro-
totypical case where takings are necessary to overcome strategic bar-
riers to voluntary transactions or other transaction costs. Bargaining
with each potential landowner-seller entails costs even in ordinary
circumstances. In the case of land assembly, the costs are exacerbated
by holdouts and other strategic bargaining practices." A takings rule,
rather than permanent transition to a liability rule, is the proper re-
sponse because ultimately the land assembly aims at a durable rather
than temporary use, and therefore is best held by a new owner of the
assembled land with traditional property rule protection. However, in
the transition between owners, a liability rule is necessary to overcome
the high transaction costs engendered by strategic bargaining practices.
Land assembly is often closely related to zoning changes. Building
projects involving multiple lots often involve transforming the uses of
those lots (for example, from single-family residential to multifamily
residential), requiring developers to institute formal proceedings with
zoning authorities for variances, special exceptions, or zoning amend-
ments. ' One important consequence of this is that developers fre-
quently lose the ability to block holdouts and other strategic problems
by hiding their plans. Zoning changes are public, and once the infor-
mation about the planned land assembly makes it into the public do-
main, private developers find themselves in the same disadvantaged
position as public authorities. Developers can avoid this conundrum
only by assuming a very large risk: they can complete land assembly
first, and only then formally explore the possibility of receiving legal
permission from zoning authorities. If such permission fails to material-
ize, the developers will likely incur a great loss, due to both the costs of
assembling and disassembling the land as well as possible payment of
"control premiums" to some sellers.2
It is little wonder, then, that many land assembly projects have
required public assistance. Opponents of government-mediated pri-
vate takings delight in listing the many instances in which government
actors have exercised the power of eminent domain in order to benefit
236 See notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
237 See Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Ratio-
nale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 Cornell L Rev 1, 46 n 219 (2006).
238 Consider Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-stock Mergers and Some
Consequences in the Law of Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U Pa L Rev 881,911 (2003) (discuss-
ing control premiums in the context of corporate acquisitions).
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affluent private purchasers2' such as The New York Times, ' Costco 4'
Pfizer,2 Sears,' and General Motors. Yet, it is far from clear that all
such government-mediated takings are, in fact, demonstrations of inef-
ficient or unjust uses of the takings power. While the popular imagina-
tion may view such takings as taking place for the private benefit of
politicians and their benefactors and at the expense of social welfare,
at least in some cases, such government-mediated takings do enhance
net social welfare and simply reflect the high costs of and strategic
barriers to land assembly.
Unfortunately, once private takings for land assembly are mediated
by the government, the chances of inefficient takings greatly increase.
Government actors approve private takings on the basis of their private
political calculus, which has no necessary connection with social wel-
241fare. Moreover, government mediators of private takings rarely pass
along the full takings cost to the private purchaser. Rather, irrespective
of the cost of taking property, the government mediators generally sell
the taken property to the private purchaser at a "fair price" that may
turn out to be far lower than the cost of acquisition. For example, in
Poletown, acquisition costs exceeded $200 million, but GM, the pur-
chaser, ultimately paid only roughly 5 percent of that cost.' Finally, even
where the government sells the property for a reasonable price, the very
mediation of the government in the transaction may increase costs.
Private takings without government mediation can avoid the inef-
ficiencies created by the government middleman. Private takers pay
acquisition costs out of pocket-the full compensation paid to the
239 See generally Steven Greenhut, Abuse of Power: How the Government Misuses Eminent
Domain (Seven Locks 2004); Castle Coalition, Floodgates Open: Tax-hungry Governments & Land-
hungry Developers Rejoice in Green Light from US Supreme Court, online at http://www.castle
coalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=44&Itemid=144 (visited Apr 14, 2009).
240 Paul Moses, The Paper of Wreckage, Village Voice 34 (June 25, 2002); Paul Moses, The
Times' Sweetheart Deal, Village Voice 16 (Nov 24,2004) (describing the condemnation of a Man-
hattan building by New York State to make way for a new New York Times building).
241 John R. Nolon and Jessica A. Bacher, Community Development: 'Didden v. Port Chester:'
Placing Eminent Domain Debate in Proper Perspective, NY L J 5 (Feb 21, 2007) (discussing the
municipal delegation to a private developer of an urban renewal project that involved condemna-
tion proceedings).
242 Kelo, 545 US at 502.
243 Debra J. Saunders, Your Land Is Their Land-Part 2, San Francisco Chron B9 (Aug 4,2005)
(discussing the taking of a local tire store though eminent domain for the relocation of Sears
Auto Center).
244 Poletown, 304 NW2d at 462 ("[T]he transfer of the property to General Motors after the
condemnation cannot be considered incidental to the taking.").
245 See generally Mueller, Public Choice III (cited in note 87).
246 See William A. Fischel, Before Kelo, 28 Reg 32,34 (Winter 2005) (discussing how most of
the financing came from the US government, not from General Motors); Ulen, 22 L & Soc Inq at
1036 (cited in note 143) (explaining that the city of Detroit intended to sell condemned property to
General Motors for about $8 million).
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landowner, as well as attendant transaction costs-and will therefore
avoid inefficient takings, so long as they are made to pay full compen-
sation. When such full compensation is paid, it will only be worthwhile
for private takers to seize the property if it is, in fact, worth more in
the taker's hands than in the current owners'. In addition, because the
taker is not an agent of the public (or anyone else), there is no possi-
bility of other agency problems such as bribery to a corrupt official to
overpay homeowners.
It is not terribly surprising, then, that to the degree that private
takings mechanisms have been offered in the past, land assembly has
been the subject that has drawn the greatest number of proposed pri-
vate takings mechanisms.
Rules for private takings in land assembly projects can be easily
fixed in advance and keyed to the size of the project, the number of
landowners, and similar factors. I offer here one proposed way of
structuring private takings for land assembly, but there are many other
plausible alternatives. Indeed, after offering my own proposal, I de-
scribe two recent innovative articles that describe alternative private
takings mechanisms.
Under my suggestion, would-be private takers would be required
to file a public notice with zoning authorities 180 days before any pro-
posed land assembly project, specifying the proposed area to be taken
and the proposed compensation scale to be paid to landowners. The
compensation scale would provide for uniform compensation for land,
fixtures, uses, and the like, both in order to assure that landowners could
easily evaluate the nature of the offer and in order to provide the basis
for subsequent review in case of later litigation. In order to be eligible
to file the notice, the private taker would need to specify a project that
includes at least a minimum number of different owners-say, twenty -
and, perhaps, a minimum spread of value-for example, with no indi-
vidual owner possessing more than 15 percent of the total value. The
filing would initiate a period in which competing bidders could offer to
acquire the same collection of properties; a competing takings bid at a
higher price would supplant the original bid and restart the clock. If the
later bid did not ultimately result in a taking, the supplanted bidder
would retain a right to sue the later bidder for damages. The ultimate
taker would be required to acquire more than a minimum share of the
land (perhaps 51 percent of both the built-up area and the land mass)
in voluntary transactions before any land could be taken involuntarily.
Finally, those owners whose land was taken through involuntary
transactions would have a right of appraisal.
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It should be clear that this proposal is highly influenced by the
rules governing corporate acquisitions.27 This should not be surprising,
as there is a commonality between land assembly and corporate ac-
quisitions: in each case the purchaser seeks to aggregate smaller pieces
of property in order to realize a control premium (the additional value
accruing to controlling the larger entity), while seeking to overcome
the strategic problems that result when so many owners attempt to
make collective control decisions. Corporate acquisitions take place
against a background rule of overcoming collective action problems
through delegated powers to management and majority rule for many
corporate decisions;m thus, much of the corporate acquisition litera-
ture focuses on the strategic difficulties created by manipulations by
acquirers or the majority of shareholders.2" Land assembly, by con-
trast, takes place against the usual background of property law and
owner autonomy and veto rights. As a consequence, the focus must be
on relieving the strategic problem of holdouts.
My suggestion is not the only way to implement a private takings
mechanism for land assembly. Two notable recent articles have pro-
posed mechanisms that are close to, though not identical to, private tak-
ings. Each offers a collective means of assembling the land involving
takings, while reducing the traditional reliance on government media-
tion. Interestingly, neither involves a full transition to private takings.
Michael Heller and Rick Hills proposed the organization of Land
Assembly Districts (LADs) comprised of the owners of all the parcels
247 See generally Martin Lipton and Erica H. Steinberger, Takeovers & Freezeouts (Law Jour-
nal Seminars 1978).
248 See Michael C. Jensen, Foundations of Organizational Strategy 51 (Harvard 1998) (discuss-
ing how the decentralized nature of the company requires substitute mechanisms of organization);
Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 Cornell L Rev 540,541-50 (1995)
(comparing agency and bargaining theories of firms); Aaron S. Edlin and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Discou-
raging Rivals: Managerial Rent-seeking and Economic Inefficiencies, 85 Am Econ Rev 1301, 1301
(1995) ("Takeovers can ... be difficult when ownership is dispersed."); Mark J. Roe, Strong Manag-
ers Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance 4 (Princeton 1994) ("Dis-
persed shareholders and concentrated management became the quintessential characteristics of the
large American firm."); Adolf A. Berle, Jr and Gardiner C. Means, The Modem Corporation and
Private Property 71 (Macmillan 1932) (observing that a large group of individuals cannot combine
their capital effectively without some members losing control over the enterprise).
249 For examples of the extensive literature on this subject, see generally Lucian A. Beb-
chuk, Symposium: Corporate Control Transactions: The Case against Board Veto in Corporate
Takeovers, 69 U Chi L Rev 973 (2002); Jonathan R. Macey, Displacing Delaware: Can the Feds
Do a Better Job Than the States in Regulating Takeovers?, 57 Bus Lawyer 1025 (2002); Lucian A.
Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87
Va L Rev 111 (2001); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv L Rev 1161 (1981); Henry G. Manne,
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J Polit Econ 110 (1965).
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of land to be assembled for a given project. M The aggregation would
stem from the owners, rather than the potential purchaser, and mem-
bership would be voluntary, including the owner's option to drop out
even after an assembly proposal. However, the LAD would act as a
unit in selling the assembled plots and arranging compensation, and
among members, decisions would be made by some version of majori-
ty vote. Government-mediated takings would remain a fallback option
for those properties held out of the project.
Amnon Lehavi and Amir Licht similarly suggest the creation of a
new private collective mechanism for land assembly. ' Lehavi's and
Licht's proposed Special-purpose Development Corporations would
acquire the land by means of government-mediated takings, but own-
ers of acquired properties would be able to choose shares in the cor-
poration as compensation in place of cash, and thereby acquire a
share of the value from assembly.
b) Land use. Land use controls provide another fertile area for de-
signating transactions for private takings. Land use controls are often
provided for by private agreements (such as covenants) or by default
common law rules of reasonableness (such as those in the law of nuis-
ance). 2 For the last century, many kinds of land use controls have been
viewed as engendering too many transaction and litigation costs to be
capable of resolution through these traditional mechanisms; conse-
quently, administrative controls through zoning have become ubiquit-
ous."3 Zoning rules limit height, bulk, density, and uses of real property
by creating different zones with different permitted building and use
rights.2 Zoning rules are constantly in flux as land use patterns change,
leading to an endless parade of rezoning in the form of amendments to
zoning ordinances and plans, or entirely new ordinances and plans, as
well as special use and variance applications.'
Zoning law is based upon the idea that incompatibility in uses and
building styles, as well as unaccounted-for negative externalities caused
by development, can be addressed "scientifically" and "comprehensive-
250 Michael Heller and Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 Harv L Rev 1465, 1469
(2008) ("The economic and moral intuition underlying the [LADs] is simple: persons who hold a
legal interest in a neighborhood's land should collectively decide whether the land ought to be
assembled into a larger parcel.").
251 Amnon Lehavi and Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 Colum L Rev 1704,1708-21
(2007).
252 See Dukeminier and Krier, Property at 855-920,951-89 (cited in note 69).
253 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning:A Reply to the Critics, 10 J Land Use & Envir L 45,
60-62 (1994).
254 See generally Comment, Building Size, Shape, and Placement Regulations: Bulk Control
Zoning Reexamined, 60 Yale L J 506 (1951).
255 For a general discussion of churning of regulation, see Fred S. McChesney, Money for
Nothing: Politicians Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion (Harvard 1997).
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ly" by regulatory experts.2 The traditional constitutional justification
for zoning thus relies heavily on a comparison with nuisance law,
which similarly seeks to end conflicts among property owners by limit-
ing unreasonable incompatible uses.27 Naturally, some quarters of aca-
demia-notably, Robert Ellickson -suggest that nuisance control can
be accomplished through traditional nuisance law, without the addi-
tional tool of zoning law.M However, this position has not achieved
general acceptance.
William Fischel has proposed viewing zoning rights as collective
property rights taken by the zoning municipality; 9 whether these rights
are more efficient than scattered private rights is very much a function
of transaction costs.27 In areas without zoning controls, private rights are
not unlimited, but incompatible uses of land may be blocked only by
successful bargaining or litigation. Thus, where the inefficiency created
by the incompatible use is sufficiently low-value relative to transaction
costs of bargaining or litigating, nonzoning systems will permit ineffi-
cient land uses. However, in areas with zoning controls, private rights
are limited by a collective decisionmaking process that almost certainly
fails to arrive at optimal land use decisions. This is because the collec-
tive mechanism is itself subject to various transaction costs and prone to
rent-seeking by decisionmakers. To put it bluntly, the zoning process can
and likely will be corrupted by politicians auctioning off collective
rights at less than their public value for private gain.26'
As with land assembly, then, land use controls are an instance of
trading off the strategic inefficiencies of individualized property con-
trols against the inefficient strategic and agency manipulations of ma-
jority control. Interestingly, in contrast with land assembly, states and
municipalities have almost universally chosen majority control for land
use and private property controls for land assembly. But, in both cases,
256 Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Pri-
vate Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 Geo Mason L Rev 827,837 (1999).
257 See Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co, 272 US 365, 388 (1926) (noting that both zoning
and nuisance laws place strong emphasis on the surrounding circumstances and locality).
258 See generally, for example, Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenant4 Nuis-
ance Rules and Fines As Land Use Controls, 40 U Chi L Rev 681 (1973) (arguing that decentralized
planning devices including covenants and nuisance laws are more efficient and equitable than
centralized zoning schemes). See also Nelson, 7 Geo Mason L Rev at 839-41 (cited in note 256) ("If
the practical consequence of zoning was to provide a collective private property right, why not
simply provide this property right directly through private [neighborhood associations]?").
259 See William A. F'schel, The Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property Rights Approach to
American Land Use Controls 55 (Johns Hopkins 1985).
260 See Oded Hochman and Haim Ofek, A Theory of the Behavior of Municipal Governments:
The Case of Internalizing Pollution Externalities, 6 J Urban Econ 416,426-27 (1979) ("[P]ollution is
only one of many urban externalities ... and we argue that society has found a solution to urban
externalities by establishing the institution of municipal government.").
261 See generally Mueller, Public Choice III (cited in note 87).
[76:517
Private Takings
a private takings mechanism may offer a better means of compromis-
ing among the strategic problems.
Again, as with land assembly, a number of private takings mechan-
isms may be imagined, but I consider one modeled on corporate acqui-
sitions. The animating principle is reformulating zoning rights as trans-
ferable veto property rights rather than as regulatory rights, while si-
multaneously providing limited private takings rights to overcome the
vetoes. Nuisance law's endorsement of "illogical doctrines"'26' and its
development into a "legal garbage can"'' have greatly diminished its
ability to help with land use controls. '. Rather than re-rationalize nuis-
ance law to serve land use purposes as suggested by Ellickson, ' one
could simply interpret existing zoning law as a definitive statement of
parties' legal property rights, permitting any party within a specified
zone (for example, x distance for every y height) to assert a veto over a
proposed construction or use. However, upon acquisition of a sufficient
number of vetoes through voluntary transactions (for example,
51 percent), the nonconforming landowner would be permitted to take
the remaining veto property rights by means of a private taking. Would-
be private takers would have to file a public notice with zoning authori-
ties 180 days before any proposed zoning change, specifying the pro-
posed zoning change as well as the price to be paid for acquiring zoning
rights according to a scale of distance and use.66
Once again, full compensation is the key to properly incentivizing
private takers in land assembly, land use, or other designated transac-
tions. If the private taker is required to pay full compensation for
property taken at its value to the original owner, the taker will eschew
inefficient transactions.
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO PRIVATE TAKINGS
In this Part, I examine several possible criticisms to expanded use
of private takings, as well the constitutionality of an expansion of
private takings.
262 See Ellickson, 40 U Chi L Rev at 721 (cited in note 258) (criticizing the balancing test of
social utility versus harm in nuisance law to determine whether damages should be paid).
263 William L. Prosser, Nuisance without Fault, 20 Tex L Rev 399,410 (1942) ("There has been
a deplorable tendency to use the word as a substitute for any thought about a problem, to call
something a 'nuisance' and let it go at that.").
264 Ellickson, 40 U Chi L Rev at 721-22 (cited in note 258).
265 See id at 719.
266 Once again, this will also prove of assistance in the event of litigation concerning the ade-
quacy of compensation.
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A. Critics of Private Takings
Past criticism of private takings has been found mainly in two dif-
ferent forms. There have been a handful of studies of the broad nine-
teenth-century delegations of eminent domain powers to private actors.
A number of these studies were undertaken by scholars of a Marxist
orientation, and their criticisms have predictably focused on exploita-
tion of property rules to benefit rich capitalists and been accompanied
by a critique of the rhetoric of the sanctity of property. 67 More popular
today are criticisms of government-mediated private takings. On this
score, scholars have decried the erosion of the public use requirement
for public exercises of eminent domain and deplored the use of state
powers for private gain.6
Both heads of criticism are concerned with the claim that eminent
domain is a power that should not be in the hands of affluent private
takers, albeit for different reasons. Critics in the first group tend to sup-
port a broad takings power and have little concern for private property
rights. Thus, the critics are not terribly concerned about the fact that
property is taken, per se. Rather, they decry the use of government
power to transfer resources back into unworthy private hands. By con-
trast, critics in the second group are primarily interested in the private
property rights of those whose assets are taken.2° Eminent domain is
seen as an extraordinary power that must be reserved only for cases of
extreme societal distress. As a result, these critics too oppose takings
that are intended to steer property back into unworthy private hands.
In evaluating opposition to private takings, I examine two sepa-
rate aspects to the criticism -the fear of allowing actors other than the
government to initiate a taking, and the objection to takings that ulti-
mately leave the taken property in private hands.
1
267 See, for example, Scheiber, 33 J Econ Hist at 249 (cited in note 41) ("[T]he interpenetration
of private business interests and governmental programs justifying expropriation continues to be a
central problem of public policy."); Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law at 146-51 (cited
in note 82) (discussing the changing expectations regarding property rights as legal thinkers
"move[d] away from physicalist definitions of property"). See also generally Stephen B. Presser,
Some Realism about Orphism or the Critical Legal Studies Movement and the New Great Chain of
Being: An English Legal Academic's Guide to the Current State of American Law, 79 Nw U L Rev
869,883 (1984) ("[Tlhe new legal left suffers from some of the classic weaknesses of Marxism.").
268 See, for example, critiques cited in Bell and Parchomovsky, 106 Colum L Rev at 1413-16
(cited in note 2) ("Everyone hates Kelo.").
269 Scheiber, 33 J Econ Hist at 237 (cited in note 41).
270 See, for example, Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development
Takings after Kelo, 15 S Ct Econ Rev 183,183-84 (2007).
271 These aspects correspond to the two central questions in privatization of government
services. See John D. Donahue, The Privatization Decision: Public End% Private Means 7 (1989)
(distinguishing questions involving financing from those involving performance).
[76:517
Private Takings
Critics of private takings may be viewed as making two separate
assumptions: both that the government is more likely than private ac-
tors to make decisions for the benefit of the publicm and that the public
benefit is more likely to be served when taken property is held by the
government than when held by private actors. Both assumptions rest on
dubious grounds.
It is certainly not news that the government is capable of poor de-
cisionmaking. There is no shortage of studies demonstrating both the
practice and theory of rent-seeking by government decisionmakers,
corruption of politics, distortions of the political process, and lack of
accountability to the interests of the wider public. 3 Even where well-
intended, government action may often be cumbersome and bureaucra-
cy-laden, and the source of extraordinarily costly and slow approaches
to public problems. Of course, the state is capable of good decisions as
well: corruption may be curbed, incentives may be aligned to limit rent-
seeking, accountability and efficiency may be encouraged. Even if well-
motivated, however, studies such as Patricia Munch Danzon's examina-
tion of eminent domain show that government, in exercising its eminent
domain power, is more likely to disadvantage the less well-off.'
Mismanagement of public resources is also legion. While many
studies focus on mismanagement of government finances and the gov-
ernment regulatory power,"' there is every reason to suspect the po-
tential for similar dysfunction in caring for noncash government as-
sets. Consider, for example, the role of the state in handling resources
like timber or oil found on public lands. Indeed, it is ironic that argu-
ments in favor of narrower interpretation of public use often rely on a
perception of government corruption and excessive solicitousness to
272 An interesting modem version of the critique can be found in Margaret Jane Radin,
Humans, Computers; and Binding Commitment, 75 Ind L J 1125 (2000). Radin builds on themes
first expressed in Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan L Rev 957 (1982),
where she argued that the personhood theory of property-positing that some control over the
resources in a person's external environment is necessary to proper self-development-is often
implicit in court opinions and commentaries, yet ignored in legal thought, and warrants distin-
guishing between "personal property" deserving special property protection and "fungible prop-
erty" warranting no such special protection. See id at 1154-55. Radin criticizes what she labels
"private eminent domain" on the grounds that its presumed encroachment upon personal values
sought to be protected by the absolute right of exclusion entailed in property rule protection.
However, Radin expresses greater comfort with private eminent domain that victimizes "busi-
nesses firms," so long as the firms enjoy reciprocal powers. See id at 1155. Radin fails to identify
reasons for believing that such personal property will be better defended if eminent domain
decisions are made solely by public actors. See id at 1159.
273 See generally McChesney, Money for Nothing (cited in note 255).
274 Munch, 84 J Polit Econ at 495 (cited in note 94).
275 See generally Amihai Glazer and Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Why Government Succeeds
and Why It Fails (Harvard 2001).
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corporate desires that undermine the idea that publicly held resources
will be well managed.
Thus, it seems odd to suggest that government decisions to carry
out takings by eminent domain will intrinsically be sounder and more
public-minded than private decisions. On the other side of the equation,
there is no doubt that an improperly disciplined takings power can lead
to inefficient takings and too little security in private property. Whether
carried out by public or private actors, the takings power is one that
may be abused. Whether the taking is public or private, the law must
carefully circumscribe the power-primarily through the payment of
full compensation"'-to ensure that the power of eminent domain is
used wisely and efficiently.
Even where government decisionmaking is presumed superior, it
is not clear that resources for public use need necessarily be held by the
public. The much-noted current trend in public administration is toward
privatization of public functions.2" Public services and facilities now
handled by private entities at the behest of government include hospit-
als, landfills, nursing homes, public transport, sewage, stadiums, fire pro-
tection, airports, water supply, and electric and gas utilities.Y As with
any other organization, the government may find outsourcing activity to
be more cost-effective."9 The decision of whether to privatize involves
the standard variables that govern outsourcing decisions: cost of moni-
toring outside versus inside activity, differences in abilities and special
skills, contracting costs, and so forth.m Empirical studies have shown
that, at least in some cases, such outsourcing to private providers has
proved a more efficient means of providing public services."
More significantly, the flaws in the ordinary market for property
suggest that a takings power is necessary outside of the context of
property dedicated to "public use." As noted earlier, asymmetric infor-
mation, holdout problems, and bilateral monopolies may characterize
276 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 106 Colum L Rev at 1440-43 (cited in note 2); Bell and
Parchomovsky, 59 Stan L Rev at 878 (cited in note 65). But see Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete
Compensation for Takings, 11 NYU Envir L J 110, 110-11 (2002) (arguing that implicit subsidies
for public goods may justify less than full compensation for public takings).
277 See Florencio L6pez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, Privatization in
the United States, 28 RAND J Econ 447,448 (1997).
278 Id.
279 See generally Gordon Walker and David Weber, A Transaction Cost Approach to Make-
or-buy Decisions, 29 Admin Sci Q 373 (1984).
M See generally Elliott D. Sclar, You Don't Always Get What You Pay for: The Economics
of Privatization (Cornell 2000).
281 See Alvaro Cuervo and Beldn Villalonga, Explaining the Variance in the Performance Effects
of Privatization, 25 Acad Mgmt Rev 581, 582 (2000) ("[Although a simple count of results would
give a considerable edge to private ownership ... the cumulative evidence is not conclusive.").
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private transactions as well as public ones. These phenomena may
block socially desirable transactions, whether the property is ultimately
to be devoted to public or private use. Consider, for example, the case
of a farmer who discovers that her land covers a previously unknown
mineral located nowhere else in the world. The mineral is worthless in
most contexts, but if used in the production of widgets, it can reduce
manufacturing costs by 90 percent. Big Corporation, a widget manufac-
turing company, proposes to purchase mining rights from the farmer in
order to extract the mineral. This is a classic case of bilateral monopoly.
While there are positive sums to be divided between the farmer and
widget manufacturer, there is a wide range of purchase prices in which
the transaction will be valuable to both the manufacturer and farmer.
Negotiating difficulties may therefore undermine the entire deal, lead-
ing to a net loss for society. A takings rule, by contrast, would be easy to
implement, as the mineral is readily valuated, and litigation costs should
be low. It is not easy to see why a takings rule should be avoided simply
because the mineral will be used for the production of widgets for Big
Corporation rather than cannons for the army.
Often, criticism of private takings seems motivated not by any par-
ticular feature of private takings. Instead, the animus is a sense that too
much property is taken altogether, whether by private or public taking.
Such criticism is sounded in numerous quarters and by critics of various
political stripes; defense of a broad takings power is similarly wide-
spread. However, both the criticism and defense are irrelevant to the
issue of private takings. The question of who should exercise the power
to take property is not identical to the question of how and when that
power should be exercised.
B. Constitutional Dimensions
Constitutional law places two central limitations on the use of the
takings power. First, by convention, if not necessarily the strict language
of the Fifth Amendment, the takings power must be exercised for a "pub-
lic use." Second, "just compensation" must be paid for taken property.
Additionally, one might argue that empowering private actors to engage
in takings constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of government
authority. I examine, in turn, the implications of each of these constitu-
tional restrictions on the law of private takings. I reconsider these ar-
guments again in Part V, where I argue that private takings might proper-
ly be considered outside the scope of the Fifth Amendment altogether.
282 See notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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1. Private takings and public use.
Formally, current federal constitutional takings law requires a pub-
lic use before property may be taken from private owners under the
eminent domain power. Thus, for example, several courts have opined
that as a result of the Public Use Clause, "a 'private taking' cannot be
constitutional even if compensated."'"
Yet, even 150 years ago, when federal courts looked more nega-
tively upon exercises of state power for the direct benefit of private
actors, federal courts would not use the Public Use Clause to place any
real limits on state exercises of the power of eminent domain."" Today,
federal courts liberally find public use. As the Supreme Court's rulings
in Berman,m Midkiffm and Kelo ' made clear, the mere fact that the
government intends to transfer taken property to private ownership
does not nullify a finding of public use. Modern jurisprudence of the
Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment has left little doubt that, at
least in federal law, the Clause should be considered "toothless."M So
long as "the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally re-
lated to a conceivable public purpose," the courts will uphold the tak-
ing, even for a private beneficiary.2
To show that a taking has a public use, the government need show
only that the taking serves a purpose that would be constitutional under
the Due Process Clause.2° This means that the taking must meet a very
low standard: not only is a miniscule benefit to public welfare sufficient,
but courts will not readily question legislative judgments about how the
public welfare is best served.29' Since there are few constitutional limita-
tions on the giving of property to private actors, 2 the Public Use Clause
places correspondingly few limitations on the exercise of eminent do-
main aimed at accomplishing such givings.
283 See, for example, Armendariz v Penman, 75 F3d 1311,1320 n 5 (9th Cir 1996) (en banc).
284 See Scheiber, 33 J Econ Hist at 235 (cited in note 41) ("The 'public use' limitation did
not arouse substantial controversy, so far as projects built and operated by government itself
were concerned.").
285 348 Us at 33.
286 467 US at 241.
m 545 US at 480.
288 David A. Dana and Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings 191 (Foundation 2002) (dis-
cussing the deferential treatment of courts to a legislative determination that a taking satisfies a
public use).
289 See Midkiff, 467 US at 241.
290 Id at 240-43 ("The 'public use' requirement is [ coterminus with the scope of a sove-
reign's police powers.").
291 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Constitution of Business, 11 Geo Mason L Rev 53, 53
(1988) ("Substantive due process is dead.").
292 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 111 Yale L J at 551 n 16 (cited in note 206).
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Past suggestions at reviving the public use limitation have expli-
citly or implicitly aimed at curbing a perceived excessive use of the
power of eminent domain or at resolving the perennial puzzle of what
regulations should be considered compensable takings. In the first cate-
gory, Richard Epstein, for example, argued for limiting the definition of
public use to the acquisitions of property for the provision of public
goods.m Epstein was quite explicit in complaining that the central fault
of a broad definition of public use to cover private takings is that it
would permit promiscuous use of the takings power."' In the second
category fall suggestions of a more robust examination of public use as
a way to distinguish compensable takings from noncompensable regula-
tions, such as those made by Joseph Sax2 and Jed Rubenfeld9 ' These
approaches find limited support in the case law.29 However, they do not
in any way affect the power to take property; they affect only the re-
quirement to pay compensation.
To be sure, some courts have surreptitiously challenged the broad
reading of public use and questioned the goals served by some exer-
cises of eminent domain.2" Additionally, some state courts have under-
taken more probing examinations of public use,' and they may yet be
followed by more state courts and legislatures."' Even today, formally,
a private taking unjustified by a public purpose remains unconstitu-
293 See Epstein, Takings at 161-81 (cited in note 3).
294 See id at 170.
295 See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L J 36, 62-63 (1964) (defining
compensable takings as those resulting from government operating in its "enterprise" capacity
and noncompensable takings as those resulting from government acting in its "arbitral" capaci-
ty). But see Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L J 149, 149
(1971) (rejecting his own earlier theory).
296 See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 Yale L J 1077, 1079-80 (1993) ("Confined to its threshold
role, 'for public use' is a stranger to the mass of takings issues wrestled with in case after case,
many of which hardly bother to mention the three-word phrase anymore.").
297 See, for example, Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104,127 (1978)
("[A] use restriction on real property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose."). Lingle v Chevron USA. Inc, 544 US 528,548 (2005),
clarified that this and similar obiter dicta should not be interpreted to create a separate actiona-
ble ground for evaluating the constitutionality of regulations under the Takings Clause.
298 Consider Bell and Parchomovsky, 106 Colum L Rev at 1412, 1440-43 (cited in note 2)
(discussing cost-benefit analysis as it relates to the decision whether to engage in eminent do-
main proceedings or to pursue regulatory action against a property).
299 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public Use Question As a Takings Problem, 71 Geo Wash
L Rev 934,936 (2003) (highlighting cases that required the government in eminent domain cases
to show a particular purpose for the taking in contravention of the doctrine requiring only a
conceivable purpose).
300 See notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
301 For an updated list of recently passed and pending state legislation aimed at limiting the
use of eminent domain, see Castle Coalition, Legislative Center, online at http://www.castlecoalition.
org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=34&Itemid=119 (visited Apr 14,2009).
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tional.m However, the reign of the broad interpretation of the Public
Use Clause has not yet ended. Consequently, it is difficult to conceive
of any substantial difficulty for private takings posed by the Public
Use Clause.
2. Private takings and just compensation.
The central limitation imposed upon takings by the federal Con-
stitution is the requirement that owners receive "just compensation"
for the taking of their private property. The result has been a vast and
varied jurisprudence of takings compensation,G as well as a rich nor-
mative literature on what compensation ought to be paid in order to
properly align incentives of takers and property owners. The law has
even pushed forward into the difficult valuation problems arising from
partial takings, temporary takings, and other oddities in the condem-
nation or its timing.m' For purposes of this analysis, the most important
element of existing law is its use of a fair market value standard for de-
termining how much compensation must be paid."" As has been noted
extensively elsewhere, one may presume that a substantial number of
property owners are inframarginal and attach a greater value to their
property than it could fetch in the market."' The result is that takings
compensation systematically undercompensates property owners.m
302 See Kelo, 545 US at 477 ("[Ilt has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the
property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B.").
303 See generally cases collected in Julius L. Sackman and Patrick J. Rohan, 4 Nichols' The
Law of Eminent Domain (Matthew Bender rev 3d ed 1990 & 1991 Supp) (synthesizing the case
law surrounding valuations of property).
304 See generally, for example, Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation, 13 J Contemp Legal
Issues 29 (2003) ("[A] doctrine of takings compensation can be developed that ... eliminates the
adverse effects of fiscal illusion, while avoiding the trap of creating moral hazards for property
owners."); Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When Should Compen-
sation Be Paid?, 23 J Legal Stud 749 (1994) (arguing for full or no compensation, based upon the
efficiency of the government regulation and the private development of the property); Thomas J.
Miceli, Compensation for the Taking of Land under Eminent Domain, 147 J Inst & Theoretical
Econ 354 (1991) (arguing that not paying compensation for takings would lead to inefficiency as
landowners would overinvest in land in order to avoid seizure); Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Ru-
binfeld, and Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q J
Econ 71 (1984) (arguing for partial compensation as a means of balancing property owners'
moral hazard and government's fiscal illusion).
305 See generally Sackman and Rohan, 4 Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain (cited in
note 303) (summarizing the case law for valuations); Julius L. Sackman and Patrick J. Rohan, 4A
Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain (Matthew Bender rev 3d ed 1990 & 1991 Supp) (summa-
rizing the case law for consequential damages).
306 See United States v Miller, 317 US 369,374 (1943).
30 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 59 Stan L Rev at 885 (cited in note 65).
308 Arguments can be made that such undercompensation is desirable, as it deters property
owners from overdevelopment in anticipation of a taking. See generally Kaplow, 99 Harv L Rev
509 (cited in note 99); Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro, 99 Q J Econ 71 (cited in note 304). But see
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There is little reason to suspect that current compensation law
poses any barrier to wider use of private takings. So long as the proper-
ty owner receives just compensation, the constitutional compensation
requirement should pose no independent barrier to private takings, and,
indeed, no suggestion to the contrary has appeared in any of the cases
endorsing government-mediated or delegated private takings. Given
that market-based compensation undercompensates, decisionmakers
may want to increase compensation to reflect owners' true reserve pric-
es, and thereby to prevent excessive takings. As noted above, nine-
teenth-century Mills Acts set compensation at above fair market val-
ue." However, there is no reason to suspect that payment of such
bounties is uniquely required in the case of private takings as a matter
of existing positive law.1°
3. Private takings and delegation.
While nothing in the Constitution explicitly bars the delegation of
sovereign powers such as eminent domain, the Supreme Court has
ruled that excessive delegations of government authority, both within
government and to nongovernmental actors, violate the Constitu-
tion."' Recent years have not seen the Court striking down legislation
for violating the nondelegation doctrine, but the doctrine remains the
subject of considerable scholarly interest, and a debate rages over
whether the doctrine should still be considered a vital part of constitu-
tional law. 1 2 A dearth of recent cases has similarly failed to deter dis-
cussions of the limits of private delegations."'
generally Bell, 13 J Contemp Legal Issues 29 (cited in note 304); Miceli, 147 J Inst & Theoretical
Econ 354 (cited in note 304).
309 See text accompanying note 215.
310 But see Epstein, Takings at 170-75 (cited in note 3) (arguing that the 50 percent surplus
above market value required by the Mill Act served to vindicate the subjective property rights of
owners and ensure social gain without deterring truly beneficial takings).
311 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495, 537 (1935); Panama Refin-
ing Co v Ryan, 293 US 388,430 (1935).
312 See, for example, Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium:A Delega-
tion Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 Yale L J 1399, 1402 (2000) (identifying a "new
delegation doctrine" that focuses not on who is making law but on how well it is being made); An-
thony S. Winer, Why the "New Non-delegation" May Not Be So New, 27 Wm Mitchell L Rev 1025,
1032-34 (2000) (suggesting that the nondelegation doctrine is being extended to cover agency
regulations instead of solely serving as a restraint on Congress). For a debate on whether the
nondelegation doctrine even exists, see Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Non-
delegation Doctrine, 69 U Chi L Rev 1721, 1721 (2002) (arguing that agents acting pursuant to a
statutory grant of executive power never exercise legislative power); Larry Alexander and Sai-
krishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U
Chi L Rev 1297, 1297-99 (2003) (disagreeing with Posner and Vermeule's thesis on normative
and descriptive grounds, and positing that the delegation of large amounts of discretion can
amount to a delegation of legislative power); Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Nondelega-
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Traditionally, the nondelegation doctrine does little more than re-
quire that Congress supply an "intelligible principle" in statutory dele-
gations."' Importantly, in its barest form, the doctrine limits only the
power of Congress; the federal Constitution places no bars upon states'
internal allocations of power. ' However, the broader principle of non-
delegation extends to all delegations of government authority to private
actors. In this form, the private delegation doctrine, as an expression of
due process, forbids the delegation, even by the states, to private actors
of powers "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State. 3.. However,
the list of such exclusive state functions is short -conducting elections,
exercising a monopoly on municipal functions, and perhaps tax collec-
tion and fire and police protection.1 Given the long history of private
exercises of eminent domain in the United States, it seems difficult to
argue that eminent domain is traditionally within the exclusive do-
main of the state.
The increasing popularity of privatizing government functions has
led to calls for broader application of the private delegation doctrine to
such public functions as imprisonment and welfare provision.' At the
other end of the political divide, voices have been raised in favor of
viewing all private actions in defense of property rights as "state action"
and all definitions of property rights as definitively part of state pow-
ers."9 Neither approach, however, reflects current law. As currently con-
stituted, the constitutional law of delegation presents no bar to ex-
panded use of private takings.
IV. PROPERTY AND TAKINGS
In this Part, I extend the analysis of private takings into a broader
analysis of the law. This Part makes two central claims. First, I show that
a private takings analysis has important implications for the theory of
tion:A Post-mortem, 70 U Chi L Rev 1331,1331-32 (2003) (criticizing Alexander and Prakash for
their defense of a "radically restrictive account of delegation").
313 See, for example, Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization As Delegation, 103 Colum L Rev
1367,1367 (2003).
314 See Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361,372 (1989).
315 See generally Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Com-
mandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 Colum L Rev 1001 (1995).
316 Flagg Brothers, Inc v Brooks, 436 US 149,157 (1978).
317 Id at 157-59.
318 See generally Jody Freeman, Extending Public Accountability through Privatization: From
Public Law to Publicization, in Michael W. Dowdle, ed, Public Accountability: Designs Dilemmas
and Experiences 83 (Cambridge 2006) (suggesting that increasing privatization of public services
provides an opportunity for greater oversight because private companies will submit to greater
scrutiny in exchange for lucrative public contracts).
319 See, for example, Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg
Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U Pa L Rev 1296,1300-02 (1982).
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legal entitlements, and that a compensated takings rule must be un-
derstood within the classic framework of property and liability rules
as an important category for organizing private property relations.
Second, I show that identifying private takings helps clarify the aims
of takings law and the nature of the constitutional demands of "just
compensation" and "public use." I begin by looking at the traditional
analysis of legal entitlements.
The analysis of legal entitlements has long and justly been domi-
nated by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed's classic analysis in
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Ca-
thedral. Briefly stated, the article suggested categorizing legal en-
titlements according to the rules governing their transfer. Legal en-
titlements protected by inalienability rules may never be transferred;
that is, the entitlement holder may never yield the protection offered by
the rule. Under property rule protection, by contrast, the entitlement
holder may voluntarily transfer the entitlement to another. However, all
transfers must be voluntary, and this means that potential takers must
agree on a price with the transferring entitlement owner. Finally, liabili-
ty rule protection permits even involuntary transfers, allowing potential
takers to seize others' entitlements, so long as they pay a price deter-
mined by a third party such as a court. Additionally, the law need not
consistently defend entitlements by the same rule over time: it may
employ pliability rules that shift from property to liability or liability
to property rules as circumstances dictate"'
As I noted earlier, takings powers create a peculiar kind of pliabili-
ty rule in which the taker initiates a temporary transition from property
rule protection to liability rule protection during the taking, but enjoys
property rule protection for the entitlement after the taking. Viewed
this way, when the state creates a takings power, it simply adds to the
existing rules by which legal entitlements are protected. A takings pow-
er, then, may not be viewed as an act that wrenches away property rights
and places an asset outside the world of property protection. Rather, it
may be seen as an act within the larger super-structure of property.
If we accept this view of takings, we can see that traditional con-
ceptions of the relationship between regulation and takings may be
reversed. Regulatory takings doctrine is often seen as extending the
protection of the Takings Clause to incomplete takings because so many
rights have been taken that a regulation is the functional equivalent of
320 Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev 1089 (cited in note 27).
321 See generally Bell and Parchomovsky, 101 Mich L Rev 1 (cited in note 30).
322 See Part I.E.
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a taking by eminent domain.32 In this conception, regulations of prop-
erty are acknowledged to be a function of government that need not
generally be accompanied by compensation. However, because regu-
lations have gone "too far" in destroying value or essential property
rights, they must be viewed as the equal of a formal taking through
eminent domain. 2'
Yet, we might just as well reverse this picture and view takings as
simply extended regulations. In this conception, when the government
permits the reassignment of property through eminent domain, it has
merely redefined the nature of legal protection attaching to property,
just as it might redefine the elements and compensation for a tort. This
reversal of the traditional conception has two important consequences.
First, one might defend private takings from constitutional scrutiny
under the Fifth Amendment by denying that private takings are the
kinds of takings contemplated by the Amendment altogether. Permit-
ting private takings could be seen as the kinds of entitlement regula-
tions that constitute the usual business of state regulation. Asking
whether a private taking serves a public use would be no more apt than
asking whether refusing an injunction for repeated trespass serves a
public use.
Second, it permits us to recognize just how much flexibility the law
has in defining legal entitlements. If one of the major functions of defin-
ing legal entitlements is specifying their protective schemes, the state's
definitions always entail an aspect of controlling the destinations of
transferring those entitlements. Reconsidering the interests protected
by nuisance law may be viewed as a question of entitlement and protec-
tion; alternatively, it may be considered a government transfer program
from nuisancer to nuisancee. In considering how to structure property,
then, the state always has the ability to build in transfer rules that pro-
mote social welfare.
This last observation leads to an important caution in considering
private takings. Private takings- even if viewed as a property regulation
rather than an extension of the regulatory power to seize through emi-
323 See Andrea L. Peterson, The False Dichotomy between Physical and Regulatory Takings
Analysis: A Critique of Tahoe-Sierra's Distinction between Physical and Regulatory Takings, 34
Ecol L Q 381,381 (2007) (arguing that physical and regulatory takings should be analyzed simi-
larly, and that the fundamental issue for both is whether fairness demands compensation). See
also Pumpelly v Green Bay Co, 80 US 166,177-78 (1871):
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if... it shall be held that if the govern-
ment refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public it can
destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in
effect, subject it to total destruction without making any compensation, because, in the nar-
rowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use.
324 See Mahon, 260 US at 415.
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nent domain-are no more intrinsically efficient than any other proper-
ty regulation. An improperly structured pliability rule or a misplaced
liability rule or any other poor protection scheme may block inefficient
transfers of entitlements or encourage inefficient ones. Determining
when and how to extend rights of private takings must therefore be
analyzed with reference to the many factors -especially transaction
costs -that have driven entitlement protection analysis over the years.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented the private takings as a vibrant and
useful power in property law, contrary to common wisdom. Notwith-
standing courts' repeated pronouncements that the law cannot allow
private takings, such have a long and distinguished pedigree in our
legal system and can be seen in such diverse areas as the law of ease-
ments and utilities.
In this Article, I have argued that private takings should often be
a preferred mechanism for achieving goals generally accomplished
through public takings. Private takings may transfer property to a pre-
ferred private owner in cases where strategic barriers prevent the trans-
fer, in precise analog to takings for transfer to a preferred public owner.
This has important implications for the theory of legal entitlements, as
well as for the public, concerning public use and takings more generally.
Indeed, a compensated private takings rule must be placed alongside
the classic property and liability rules as an important category for or-
ganizing private property relations.
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